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ARTICLE 
Affirmative Action and the First Amendment: The 
Attainment of a Diverse Student Body Is a Permissible 
Exercise of Institutional Autonomy 
Darlene C. Goring" 
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affrrmative-action 
program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so 
is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take 
accoun t  of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons 
equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the 
Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As we prepare to enter the next millennium, issues of race and class 
remain at the forefront of America's seemingly never-ending struggle to 
reconcile the goal of equality with the social, political, and economic 
realities of modem society. As we look forward, unanswered questions 
from the past continue to haunt us. The constitutional viability of race­
based affirmative action programs is such a question. Although this 
question was brought before the United States Supreme Court twenty 
years ago in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 2 a definitive 
answer continues to elude us. 
In 1978, Allan Bakke and the University of California looked to the 
Supreme Court to determine the role that race-based preferences would 
play in the allocation of educational opportunities. 3 The challenge of 
balancing the competing interests of racial minority groups with the 
preservation of equality under the law did not present a novel challenge. 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.B.A., Howard 
University; J.D. and LL.M., Northwestern University School of Law. For valuable comments and 
reactions to earlier drafts of this Article, I would like to thank John Batt and Leonard S. Rubinowitz. 
I would like to thank Patrick Torre, Lisa M. Wilson, and Jeff Flcischakcr for their research 
assistance. I dedicate this Article to my late father Cecil C. Goring. 
J.). 
I. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion ofBlaclanun, 
2. Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 8. 
3. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276 (opinion of Powell, J.); see also infra text accompanying note 
8. 
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Since 1886, the Supreme Court has addressed similar issues in a number 
of cases, including Plessy v. Ferguson,4 Yick Wo v. Hopkins,5 Korematsu 
v. United States,6 and Brown v. Board of Education.1 But this time, the 
Court in Bakke fragmented into three distinct factions, 8 leaving no 
definitive answer, little guidance, and twenty years of controversy 
regarding the constitutional pennissibility of race-based admissions 
programs. 
During the past twenty years, and in the face of continued silence on 
this issue from the Court,9 the primary source of guidance has been 
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Supreme Court's analysis of the protections afforded 
to blacks pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment reinforced the constitutional permissibility of racial 
segregation. Justice Brown concluded that 
[t]he object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two 
races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, 
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. 
Id. at 544. 
5. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons 
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; 
and the. equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."). 
6. • 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from 
designated military areas as a valid exercise of congressional war powers during World War II}. 
7. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but 
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."). 
8. In Bakke, the Justices split into three primary factions. Justice Powell wrote a the court's 
opinion. See 438 U.S. at 269. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmon concurred in the 
judgment in part and dissented in part. See id. at 324 (arguing that application of the strict scrutiny 
test to evaluate the constitutionality of the University's admissions program was inappropriate because 
no fundamental right or suspect classification was at issue in the case). Justices Stevens, Stewart, 
Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part See id. 
at 408 (concluding that the University's admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964). 
9. The Supreme Court refused to hear arguments in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), in which the plaintiffs challenged the race-based 
admissions program at the University of Texas School of Law. A similar challenge was raised in 
Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), 
cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997). However, fearing a possible adverse decision and in reaction 
to the Clinton administration's withdrawal of support, this case was settled for $433,500 in December 
1997, prior to a decision from the Supreme Court. See Melinda Henneberger, On Race, an Optimist 
in an Unlikely Place, N.Y. nMES, Dec. 14, 1997, at NJ5; see also Jan Crawford Greenburg, Civil 
Rights Groups Pay Teacher to Avoid Court: Coalition Feared Adverse Ruling by High Court Would 
Damage Affirmative Action, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1997, at Al. For a discussion of the reasons 
underlying the Taxman settlement, see Nicholas deB. Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color 
Blind: Just Blind, N.Y. nMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 42. 
This may be the first time that money has been used directly to take an important public 
policy issue off the Court's docket. All this arose because the case was framed to portray 
person-to-person competition for a job in which race alone was the decisive factor. This 
aspect fitted neatly with the notion, widespread among opponents of affirmative action, 
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Justice Powell's opinion. In Bakke, Justice Powell accepted as constitu­
tionally pennissible the idea that the attainment of diversity can serve as 
a compelling justification for the use of race-based preferences in 
admissions decision-making. 10 In so doing, he circumvented the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment11 and used the counter­
vailing guarantee of academic freedom provided by the First Amend­
ment12 to cloak educational institutions in the warm blanket of "institu­
tional autonomy."13 The opinion thus provides educational institutions the 
right to label decisions about "who may teach, what may be taught, how 
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted"1' as academic decisions 
insulated by the constitutionally protected doctrine of academic freedom. 
Justice Powell, and the few courts that have followed his lead, 
however, have failed to establish a nexus between the exercise of 
institutional autonomy and the academic nature of admissions decisions 
that are undertaken with the goal of attaining a diverse student body. 
The absence of an academic basis for the use of race or ethnicity in this 
context raises legitimate concerns that "affinnative action in the name of 
diversity is content-based regulation of speech"1s that infringes upon First 
Id. 
Id. 
that it creates a zero-sum game in which there is a loser for every winner and that the 
game is won and lost on the basis of race. Thus it obscures the larger goal of finding and 
preserving room for blacks in all aspects-economic, political, educational, social-and 
at all levels of society. 
10 .  438 U.S. a t  3 1 1-15 .  
1 1 .  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens  of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; 
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances." Id. 
13. The definition of "institutional autonomy " is an evolving amalgam of thoughts and ideas. 
Professor Matthew Finkin has described this concept as "a desire in search of a legal theory." 
Matthew Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 856 (1983). He 
continues: 
The institutional desire is to be left alone. It calls to mind the condition von Rumbolt 
sought for the German university . . . freedom and solitude. It also reminds us that, at 
certain points, university autonomy ts a necessary condition for freedom of teaching and 
inquiry ... [a]nd the elemental infirmity in the theory of"institutional" academic freedom 
lies in its refusal to admit of distinctions. The desire is laudable-but the theory claims 
too much. 
Id. at 856-57. 
14. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
15. Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1850 (1996). 
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Amendment rights of other students and faculty within the academy.16 
This Article provides an analytic framework for this nexus, and posits 
constitutionally permissible justifications for applying the First Amend­
ment to insulate the admissions decision-making process. 
Part II of this Article examines the expansion of the academic freedom 
doctrine, as safeguarded by the First Amendment, to protect decisions 
made by educational institutions, and the extent to which the Court has 
recognized the rights of institutions to act autonomously. Included is a 
discussion of whether the attainment of diversity is a constitutionally 
permissible justification for using race-based classifications in academic 
decision-making. 
Part III explores whether the admissions decision-making process falls 
within the realm of academic decisions traditionally protected by the First 
Amendment. The Court has never articulated a standard for determining 
whether the decision-making engaged in by educational institutions is 
academic and thus protected by the First Amendment or whether it is 
unprotected administrative decision-making. I propose a restrictive two­
prong standard that focuses on the expertise of the decision-maker as well 
as the unique nature of academic decisions. Through the use of 
experiential narratives, I then establish a nexus between the attainment of 
diversity and the pedagogical goals of teaching, inquiry, research, and 
publication. The use of such anecdotal evidence to establish the impact 
of diversity in the classroom is both functional and necessary. These 
anecdotes provide a first-hand look into the classroom setting, and 
recount the actual experiences of students and faculty in ways that are not 
conveyed by reading factual case summaries. 17 The use of anecdotal 
16. See id. at 1875. Professor Chen states: 
When a public university admits students or hires or promotes faculty members according 
to a diversity-inspired affirmative action plan, it is acting simultaneously as speaker and 
regulator. Unless it claims that race or ethnicity per se constitutes "academic" grounds 
for favoring a particular student or professor, a university has no legitimate "academic 
freedom" defense against rules that proscribe or circumscribe race-based decisionmaking. 
Rather, if a university is using affinnative action more loosely to enhance its general 
intellectual profile, the diffuse value of any incremental diversity achieved by the 
university at large is vastly outweighed by the potential impact on the speech of individual 
students and professors. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
17. See Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher 
Education, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1364 (1996). 
Id. 
Because di�ersity in higher education is not susceptible 
to
 direct proof, courts must rely 
o� the testimony of educators regarding the benefits of diversity. Educators have 
�1�es�d firsthm:'d the benefits that diverse student bodies bring to their educational 
institutions over time. Such individuals arc extremely knowledgeable about the learning 
process and the complexity of its functioning inside and outside of the classroom. 
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evidence to examine the impact of diversity in the classroom is necessary 
because of the absence of empirical studies of this area.11 
Part IV acknowledges that institutional autonomy does not insulate all 
decisions made by educational institutions from constitutional scrutiny. 
In Part IV, I explore the question left unanswered by Justice Powell's 
opinio n  in Bakke; that is, how far can educational institutions go in the 
exercise of their right to select a diverse student body before infringing 
on the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment? I 
conclude this analysis by relying upon a strict interpretation of the idea 
of diversity as conceptualized by Justice Powell, and note ultimately that 
diversity cannot be realistically achieved without the consideration of race 
and ethnicity as factors in the admissions decision-making process. 
II. JUSTICE POWELL'S ADVOCACY OF INSTITimONAL AUTONOMY TO 
ACHIEVE STIJDENT BODY DIVERSITY 
Academic freedom is traditionally viewed as a right asserted by 
individuals, such as students and faculty, in the exercise of their 
educational pursuits.19 There is no dispute that First Amendment protec­
tion is warranted in this regard. Institutional autonomy, on the other 
hand, expands the notion of academic freedom, and with it the protections 
of the First Amendment, by recognizing the right of educational 
institutions to engage in decision-making regarding academic matters with 
limited judicial scrutiny. This doctrine serves as the cornerstone for 
Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that a university's decision-making 
18. See Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge for 
Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. I, 4 (1998). 
Id. 
A debate has emerged in recent years over the impact of social difference on law school 
education. Studies and anecdotal accounts have suggested that women are disadvantaged 
in law school classrooms because of differential patterns of participation and inclusion, 
and because of gendered reactions to distinctively legal styles of discourse. Although far 
less systematic attention has been paid to the effects of race, class, or school status on 
students' experience in law schools, there have been accounts suggesting that students of 
color also feel excluded. 
19. The ideas and concepts discussed in this Article are applicable to constitutionally mandated 
guarantees of academic freedom. For a discussion of the origins and scope of professional academic. 
freedom, see generally Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic 
Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1265 (1988); Walter P. Metzger, Professional and Legal 
Limits to Academic Freedom, 20 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1993); Developments in the Law-Academic 
Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1968). For additional discussions regarding the development of 
constitutional academic freedom, see David M. Rabban, A Functional Ana/ysu of "Individual" and 
"Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1990, at 227; William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme 
Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1990, at 79. 
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process regarding the "selection of its student body" is a valid exercise 
of its right to academic freedom. 20 In this section, I deconstruct the 
doctrine of institutional autonomy. Following an examination of the 
interplay between the First Amendment and the diversity rationale as set 
forth by Justice Powell in Bakke, I explore the development of institution­
al autonomy as an extension of traditional n otions of academic freedom. 
Embedded within this analytical framework is a discussion of judicial 
deference to the decision-making authority of educational institutions that 
is the derivative result of extending First Amendment protections to 
institutional decision-making. This section concludes with a discussion 
of judicial recognition of the doctrine of institutional autonomy to 
insulate educational institutions from constitutional scrutiny when the 
institutions utilize race-based criteria to select a diverse student body. 
The facts of Bakke are all too familiar. Allen Bakke, a white male 
m edical school applicant, was denied admission to the Medical School of 
the University of California at Davis.21 As a result, he challenged the 
constitutionality of the University's race-based affinnative action 
program.22 In accordance with the rule set forth in Korematsu v. United 
States, 23 the use of race-based classifications is considered suspect by the 
Court, and triggers the application of the strict scrutiny test to evaluate 
compliance with the Equal Protection Clause. 24 Notwithstanding the 
benign25 nature of a classification, the Court noted that "[t]he guarantees 
of equal protection . . . 'are universal in their application, to all persons 
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of 
20. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U .S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). 
21. See id. at 277. 
22 . See id. 
23. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A)ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional . 
It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."). 
24. See id.; :see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
25. Justice Powell rejected the University's argument that "discrimination against members of 
the white 'majority' cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as 'benign."' Id. at 294. 
The basis for this rejection was multifaceted. First, Justice Powell dismissed the premise that the 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws can have a different application depending on the racial or 
ethnic group allegin.g �isc.
�imination . See id. at 295. Such a practice would, according to Justice 
Powell, create an art1fic1al two-class theory" that is repugnant to the fundamental purpose underlying 
the Fourteenth Amendment Id. Second, there would be definitional and administrative problems 
assoc�ated wi� "varying
. 
the �eve
.
I o:, judici� review according to a perceived 'preferred• status of 
a particular racial or
" 
ethmc. mt�onty. Id. Fmally, the Court questioned the "benign" nature of any preference because [n]othmg m the Constitution supports the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impennissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups." Id. at 298. 
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race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a 
pledge of the protection of equal laws. "'26 
In order to justify the use of a race-based classification, the strict 
scrutiny test demands a ''judicial detennination that the burden [borne] on 
that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest."27 The University proffered several justifications for the 
program, including "improving the delivery of health-care services to 
communities currently underserved,"21 attaining "a diverse student 
body,"29 "countering the effects of societal discr:mination,"30 and 
26. Id. at 293 (quoting Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 3S6, 369 (1886)). 
27. Id. at 299. The Court also stated that "in 'order to justify the usc of a suspect classification, 
a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally pennissiblc and substantial, and 
that its use of the classification is "necessary . . . to the accomplishment" of its purpose or the 
safeguarding of its interest."' Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)). 
28. Id. at 310. Justice Powell rejected this argument because the University failed to establish 
that the "special admissions program [was] either needed or geared to promote" the goal of 
improving the delivery of health care services to underserved communities. Id. 
29. Id. at 311. 
30. Id. at 306. The Court rejected this justification because remedial programs, such as the one 
used by the University, could not justify the usc of race-based criteria "in the absence of judicial, 
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at 307. Justice 
Powell concluded that to hold otherwise "imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who 
bear no responsibility for whatever hann the beneficiaries of the special admissions program arc 
thought to have suffered." Id. at 310. 
Professor Charles R. Lawrence Ill, criticizes Justice Powell's position, arguing that by defining 
diversity within the paradigm of First Amendment jurisprudence, we arc forced to ignore the remedial 
nature of affinnative action programs. See Charles R. Lawrence Ill, Each Othe r's Ha rvest: 
Diversity's Deepe r Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 766-68 (1997). This construct, he asserts, docs 
not further the true goal of diversity-the elimination of racism and subordination-but only serves 
to "maintain the status quo and [protect] the power of those who arc currently privileged." Id. at 
777. He states that 
[t]his argument constitutionalizes the po wer of a privileged educational establishment to 
detenninc what learning shall be valued and who shall be taught University faculties, 
administrations, and boards of trustees continue to be dominated by white males. Under Justice 
Powell's analysis, these white males have a constitutional right to detennine, based on ideas and 
values widely shared by that privileged group, who will gain access to knowledge and power. 
Thus, a racially diverse student body is a compelling interest for only as long as those who run 
the school think it so. Powell's reasoning could as easily justify an all white school as one that 
is racially diverse. 
Id. at 770-71.  
As discussed in  Part IV below, I agree with  Professor Lawrence that there certainly is  a possibility 
that racial or ethnic minorities could be excluded from a revised and exclusionary definition of 
diversity. See infra Part IV. However, in light of the impact of Hopwoodv. Te xas, 18 FJd 932 (5th 
Cir. 1996), ce rt. de nied, SIS U.S. 1033 (1996), and Proposition 209,_ see CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 
31(a)1 we must recognize that in the absence of constitutionally pennissible justifications for the use 
of race-based selection criteria, minorities will be excluded from educational opportunities. We will 
not only be "in danger of losing sight" of affinnative action's "true purpose: anti-racism," we will 
be faced with the more immediate danger o f a return to the days of Sweatt  v. Pa inte r, 339 U.S. 629 
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"reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in 
medical schools and in the medical profession."31 
Justice Powell determined that the University's only constitutionally 
permissible goal was the attainment of a diverse student body.32 He 
viewed the attainment of a diverse student body as an academic decision 
deserving of judicial deference because it fell within the University's 
right to academic freedom.33 Justice Powell noted that "(t]he freedom of 
a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the 
selection of its student body."34 As a result, the Court permitted the 
( 1 950), and Mclaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher &iucation,. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
Lawrence, supra, at 772. In fact, the Supreme Court already has rejected the use of race-based 
affinnative action as a means of remedying past societal discrimination or curing the continuing 
effects of racism within American society. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 227 (1995) (holding that all governmental classifications based on race are subject to strict 
scrutiny); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1 988) (holding that the standard of 
review for racial classifications should be strict scrutiny); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of Powell J.) ("[R]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are 
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examinations."). As a result, we are 
left with the slender thread of Justice Powell's First Amendment argument. It is important that we 
develop the definition of diversity within that argument if Ba/cke is to have relevance in the future. 
31 . Balck£, 438 U.S. at 306. The Court rejected this justification as facially invalid because 
"[p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is 
discrimination for its own sake." Id. at 307. 
32. See id. at 31 1- 12. In his biography of Justice Powell, John C. Jeffries, Jr., discusses the 
origins of the Balck£ opinion and the conflict that led to Justice Powell's reconciling the use of race­
based preferences with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., AND1HE ERA OF JUDICIAL BALANCE 475-76 (1994). Jeffries gained 
insight from Bob Comfort, Justice Powell's law clerk, who contributed research and insight on the 
Bakke opinion. In discussing the constitutional permissibility of diversity as a compelling state 
interest, Jeffries notes that 
Id. 
[a]s a justification for minority preferences, Comfort argued, diversity was better than 
compensation-better, because more limited. Compensation implied that all groups hurt 
in the past could now claim offsetting preferences. Diversity reached only those who 
currently remained unrepresented. Diversity cut against affinnative action for Asians or 
others who had made it  on their own. Also, Comfort favored diversity because of the 
flexible way that such concerns traditionally had been dealt with: "When Harvard College 
receives applications from Idaho farmboys, it does not establish a separate admissions 
track for them. It does not insulate them from comparison with other applicants and 
guarantee them a number of safe seats. Instead, it takes the fact of geographical origin 
as one factor weighing in the farmboy's favor when he is compared against all other 
applicants . . .. " Race should be handled the same way. Since race was "simpl y  one 
ingredi�nt of e
�
ucational diversity," it was "unnecessary to isolate racial minorities from 
companson wtth other applicants." This, said Comfort, was the crucial defect in the 
Dav� prog�. It  was not that Allen Bakke fell short when compared to the minority 
admtttces. Rather, Bakke was not compared with them at all." 
33. See Balck£, 438 U.S. at 3 1 1 -12. 
34. Id. at 312. 
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University, as a separate autonomous entity, to rely on countervailing 
First Amendment guarantees of academic freedom to protect its right to 
make admissions decisions.35 Justice Powell stated that "[a]cademic 
freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long 
has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."36 Citing 
35. See id. at 313. For a criticism of this view, see Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A 
Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity," 1993 WIS. L. REV. 105. Professor Foster 
criticizes Justice Powell's reliance on the First A mendment as justification for the use of race-based 
criteria within the context of a "speech paradigm," which she defines as .. whether First Amendment 
values are sufficiently promoted by the policies to justify the affirmative inclusion of historically 
excluded individuals." id. at 121. She argues that this framework is flawed because it "ignores the 
broader equality concerns underlying the enactment of the policy at issue in that [Bakke] case." id. 
at 122. As  further explanation for her position, she notes: 
Powell could find no principled way, under a speech paradigm, that an institution could 
value one person's viewpoints or ideas over another person's viewpoints or ideas. 
Diversity, under a speech paradigm, is purely forward-looking in that the exclusive goal 
is to multiply the variety of viewpoints and ideas brought into an institutional setting. 
Unlike the traditional equality paradig m  [ which is defined as "whether past inequities, and 
their present effects, justify affirmative attention to differences such as race in the 
distribution of societal benefits and burdens"], a speech paradigm fails to acknowledge 
the social context in which differences, and viewpoints, exist. Hence, it docs not take into 
account past inequities toward certain differences, and their present effects on persons pos· 
sessing those differences, and thus on their viewpoints. Thus, a speech paradigm cannot 
justify differential treatment on the basis of characteristics such as race in distributing 
scarce social goods. 
id. Professor Foster favors the alternative analysis set forth by the majority opinion in Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which also used First Amendment principles to 
justify the need for diversity. Professor Foster argues: 
The majority, under the equality paradigm predominant in its other equal protection cases, 
retained its focus on historical inequities, and their present effects, in concluding that 
diversity was a sufficient justification for the race-conscious FCC policies at issue. What 
was clearly of paramount importance in  justifying the FCC policies in Metro Broadcasting 
was that minority beneficiaries of the policies, and hence their viewpoints, were signifi­
cantly under-represented because of historical exclusion of minorities in the broadcasting 
industry.  
Foster, supra, at 123. 
36. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. In his examination ofJustice Powell's Bakke opinion, Professor 
Carl Cohen rejects the criticism that Justice Powell was either "naive" or "confused" in his 
recognition of the importance of diversity in the admissions process for professional school students. 
Carl Cohen, Equality, Diversity, and Good Faith, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1261, 1272 (1980). Professor 
Cohen writes: 
Id. 
[Justice P owell] is fully aware that the need for diversity may vary with context. He 
believes-and as former President of the American Bar Association he can be said to have 
some understanding of the needs of the professional schools-that diversity of students 
in the class is a desideratum as important in medical and legal education as in the liberal 
arts. Reasonable persons may differ o n  this question. Powell's point, however, is that 
if race is to be a factor in professional school admissions it may be a factor for no other 
reasons. 
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Justice Frankfurter's four essential freedoms from Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire,31 Justice Powell emphasized that "(t]he atmosphere of 
'speculation, experiment and creation'-so essential to the quality of 
higher education-is widely bel ieved to be promoted by a diverse student 
body."38 
The troublesome aspect of this reasoning is that it fails to set forth the 
analytic paradigm relied upon by Justice Powell to develop a nexus 
between diversity and traditional definitions of academic freedom. 
Specifically, Justice Powell merely cites Key ishian v. Board of Regents39 
for the proposition that diversity serves an academic interest because "the 
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to 
the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many 
peoples.'>4° Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke does not offer any 
additional guidance. 41 Instead, it cautions that this discretion is not 
absolute, but must yield to "constitutional l imitations protecting individual 
rights.'>42 
3 7. 3 54 U.S. 234 (19 57). The four essential freedoms of a university are the right "to 
detennine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, 
and who may be admitted to study." Id at 263 (Frankfurter, J. concurring) (citation omitted). 
3 8. Bakke, 43 8 U.S. at 3 12. Neil L. Rudenstine, President of Harvard University, notes that 
Justice Powell's views on diversity are consistent with Harvard's historical commitment to this issue 
as evidenced by the philosophical positions of John Stuart Mill and past Harvard President Charles 
Eliot. See NEIL L. RUDENSTINE, HARVARD UNIV., THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1 993 -199 5: 
"DIVERSITY AND LEARNING," at 39 (19 95) (commenting on the importance of preserving diverse 
educational opportunities). Rudenstine states: 
Id. 
In the course of Justice Powell's exposition, one can hear echoes of Mill's insistence on 
"robust" exchanges, or Eliot's commitment to educating future leaders of a heterogenous 
democratic society. Indeed, Justice Powell's pivotal opinion in Bakke has its roots in a 
long tradition of thought ... [that] preceded, by more than a century, the advent of 
affinnative action programs and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 19 64. It is a 
tradition that is still vital, and still crucial to our nation's future. 
39. 385 U.S. 589 (1966). 
40. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 1 2 -13 (quoting Keyishian, 3 85 U.S. at 603). 
4 1 .  P�fessor 1. Peter Byrne notes that Justice Powell failed to articulate a justification for the 
use of the First Amendment to insulate administrative activities somewhat removed from teaching 
and scholarship from the scrutiny of the Equal Protection  Clause. See I. Peter Byrne, Academic 
Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 2 51, 2 57 ( 1 9 89 ). 
42 . Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 14. 
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A. Judicial Recognition of Institutional Autonomy 
I. Expansion of Academic Freedom to Educational Institutions 
601 
The origins of institutional autonomy are found in the Supreme Court's  
broad interpretation and application of the academic freedom doctrine.'43 
The Supreme Court's decisions in Sweezy v. New Hamrshire,.,. more 
specifically, Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion,'' and later in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents'6 serve as the foundation upon which the 
constitutional guarantee of institutional autonomy is  constructed. 47 In 
43. The concept of academic freedom has varying definitions and interpretations. See generally 
Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and History, 28 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 1 ,  431 (1 963). Fuchs states: 
Academic freedom is that freedom of members of the academic community, assembled 
in colleges and universities, which underlies the effective performance of their functions 
of teaching, learning, practice of the arts, and research. The right to academic freedom 
is recognized in order to enable faculty members and students to carry on their roles. 
Id.; see also Estelle A. Fishbein, New Strings on the Ivory Tower: The Growth of Accountability in 
Colleges and Universities, 12 J.C. &. U.L. 381,  382 (198S). Fishbein states: 
Traditionally, academic institutions were relatively free of outside constraints in managing 
their internal affairs. Decisions regarding who to hire and fire, who to promote, who to 
admit as students, which research to pursue and under what conditions, were matters left 
wholly to the discretion of trustees, administrators, and faculties. The management of an 
institution's internal affairs was jealously guarded and, in large measure, insulated from 
legislative and even judicial intrusion by the halo of "academic freedom." There is no 
single, universally accepted definition of"academic freedom" but the following admirably 
captures the concept: 
"Academic freedom is that aspect of intellectual liberty concerned with the peculiar 
institutional needs of the academic community. The claim that scholars are entitled to 
particular immunity from ideological coercion is premised on a conception of the 
university as a community of scholars engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, collectively 
and individually, both within the classroom and without, and on the pragmatic 
conviction that the invaluable service rendered by the university to society can be 
performed only in an atmosphere entirely free from administrative, political, or ecclesi­
astical constraints on thought and expression." 
Id. (footnote omitted). The following definition of academic freedom by Professor Chen is also 
useful: 
When properly entrusted to thinkers rather than administrators, academic freedom fuels 
the discovery of truth "out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of 
authoritative selection." Defenders of educational affinnative action are likely to dispute 
this account of academic freedom. From their perspective, academic freedom lies not in 
the expressive liberty of individual professors and students, but in the university's ability 
to implement affinnative action without fear of judicial review. 
See Chen, supra note 15, 1 874 (citations omitted). 
44. 3 5 4  U.S. 23 4 ( 1957). 
45. See id. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
46. 3 85 U.S. 589 (1967). 
47. See Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note 19, at 1 3 15 (arguing that the origins 
of institutional autonomy predate the Sweezy decision). 
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both cases, the Court detennined the extent that an individual faculty 
member, not an institution, may utilize the F irst Amendment's protection 
of academic freedom. In both opinions, however, the Justices also 
discussed the broader implications of applying the academic freedom 
doctrine to the entire educational sphere. 48 
In Sweezy, the Supreme Court found the New Hampshire Attorney 
General's exercise of his authority to compel Paul Sweezy to disclose his 
knowledge of subversive activities violative of Sweezy's due process 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Sweezy, who had on several 
occasions delivered lectures to humanities classes at the University of 
New Hampshire,so refused to cooperate with the Attorney General 's 
investigation of subversive activities, citing infringement of his First 
Amendment rights.s1 In response, the Attorney General utilized the 
assistance of the state Superior Court, which was authorized to "find 
recalcitrant witnesses in contempt of court."s2 The court found Sweezy 
in contempt and jailed him for refusing to disclose the requested 
information.s3 The Supreme Court, however, held that the Attorney 
General's activities were not related to any state interest that would 
warrant interference with Sweezy's due process rights.54 
This decision, issued by Chief Justice Warren, was the Court's first 
extension of the constitutional protection of the First Amendment to 
academic freedom.ss Chief Justice Warren concluded that "there 
unquestionably was an invasion of [Sweezy's] liberties in the areas of 
academic freedom and political expression-areas in which government 
48. See also Justice Douglas's statement in Griswold 11. Connecticut, in which he interpreted the 
First Amendment to include protection for academic freedom: 
In other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, 
contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press 
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to 
receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to 
teach-indeed the freedom of the entire university community. Without those peripheral 
rights the specific rights would be less secure. 
381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1%5) (citations omitted). 
49. Sweezy, 3S4 U.S. at 2S3-S4. 
SO. See id. at 234. 
5 1 .  Specifically, Sweezy refused to "disclose his knowledge of the Progressive Party i n  New 
Hampshire or of persons with whom he was acquainted in that organization." Id. at 24 1-42. 
S2. Id. at 238. 
SJ. See id. at 244-45. 
S4. See id. at 2S4. 
. 
SS . .  Al�?gh Chief Justice Warren did not expressly refer to the First Amendment when 
discussmg th15 ISSue, he recognized that Sweezy's rights to be free from invasions of his liberties "in the areas of academic freedom and political expression" were "safeguarded by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment" Id. at 250. 
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should be extremely reticent to tread. "56 He examined the parameters of 
the protection afforded by academic freedom further when he explained 
that 
[t]he essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy 
that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait 
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would 
imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly 
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly 
is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as 
absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and 
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization 
will stagnate and die.H 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter echoed the Chief 
Justice's  arguments on this issue, and added that additional constitutional 
protection should be afforded to Sweezy as a member of the academic 
community.58 This opinion focused on the detrimental effects of 
governmental intervention into this unique area o f  society.59 Justice 
Frankfurter noted that a free society depends on free universities:60 "This 
means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life 
of a university.''61 Justice Frankfurter further cited with approval the 
language of a South African remonstrance policy identifying ''the four 
essential freedoms" necessary to foster an academic atmosphere "most 
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. •'62 The now oft-cited 
language p rovides that a university must have the authority "to detennine 
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how 
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. •'63 It is important 
to note, however, that this authority is not absolute.64 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court was asked once again to 
interpret the legitimacy of a state's attempt to root out subversive activity 
within a n  academic community. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,65 
several faculty members at the State University of New York refused to 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. See id. at 26 1 -63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
59. See id. at 262. 
60. See id. 
61.  Id. ("It matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action that 
inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so 
indispensable for fruitful academic labor."). 
62. Id. at 263. 
63. Id. 
64. See infra Part IV. 
65. 385 U .S .  589 (1967). 
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sign certificates attesting that they were not Communists.66 As a result 
of their subsequent dismissal, the faculty members sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief citing various federal constitutional violations.67 The 
Supreme Court found the statutory certification requirement unconstitu­
tionally vague and not narrowly tailored.68 Although the Court recog­
nized the state's compelling interest in "keeping subversives out of the 
teaching ranks,"69 the Court noted that the interests of faculty members 
in preserving their right to academic freedom as protected by the F irst 
Amendment also must be considered.70 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That 
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not 
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant 
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the 
community of American schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace 
of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide 
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a 
multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind ofauthoritative selection. "71 
There are dicta from the Supreme Court's decisions in Sweezy and 
Keyishian suggesting that the guarantee o f  academic freedom is not 
limited to faculty members and students .  More importantly, these 
decisions indicate the Court's willingness to expand this protection to 
other areas of the educational arena. 72 By protecting the integrity of the 
classroom, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some areas of society 
must not be subjected to excessive governmental interference in order to 
ensure that they function properly and achieve their goals. 
Sweezy, Keyishian, and Bakke provide the framework for developing 
the doctrine of institutional autonomy. A majority of the Supreme Court, 
however, has yet to adopt this doctrine into established First Amendment 
66. See id. at 592. 
67. The Feinberg law provided procedures for the removal or disqualification of individuals in 
the public school system for engaging in subversive conduct See id. at 594-95. 
68. See id. at 597-99. 
69. Id. at 602. 
70. See id. at 603. 
7 1 .  Id. (citation omitted). 
72. See ROBERT K. POCH, ACADEMIC FREEOOM IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: RIGHTS, 
REsPONSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS, 1993 ASHE-ERIC HIGHER EDUCATION REPORT NO. 4 (1993). 
Poch notes that in addition to recognizing the academic rights of faculty, 
the courts recognize also the rights of colleges and universities to set and maintain 
pedagogical standards, see that appropriate course subject matter is taught by the faculty, 
and ensure that 
.
faculty are not engaged in the use of unprotected speech in the classroom. Th� classroom is 
· · · the arena where institutional authority is greatest and courts are most 
hesitant to enter. 
Id. at 29. 
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jurisprudence.73 By the same token, the Court has not rejected it. 
Professor J. Peter Byrne acknowledges that the doctrine of institutional 
autonomy represents an "abrupt departure from the academic tradition of 
academic freedom."74 But Professor Byrne also concludes that the 
protection of institutional autonomy has become necessary in order to 
respond to "[s]ignificant changes in the social function of the university 
and in its legal status. "75 In addition, permitting an educational institution 
to function as an independent entity serves as recognition of the unique 
level of administrative and pedagogical expertise necessary to manage an 
educational institution. Finally, expansion of the academic freedom in 
this context is entirely consistent with Chief Justice Warren's statement 
in Sweezy that "[n]o field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by 
man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. "76 The recognition that 
educational institutions are entitled to constitutional protection for 
academic decision-making is a much needed judicial discovery. 
2. Judicial Recognition of Institutional Autonomy 
a. Administrative Decisions 
The aforementioned decisions do not stand alone in their willingness 
to expand First Amendment protections to educational institutions. These 
decisions, and several Supreme Court and lower court decisions, 
recogn ize the doctrine of institutional autonomy in a variety of adminis­
trative and academic contexts. For example, with respect to administra­
tive decisions, Justice Stevens, concurring with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 77 noted that judgments regarding the 
Id. 
73. See generally Rabban, supra note 19 . 
74. Byrne, supra note 41, at 312. Byrne states: 
The Court's new elaboration of institutional academic freedom does contain anomalies. 
The First Amendment rarely protects institutional decision-making so indirectly related 
to expression as student admissions or faculty hiring. It may be hard to identify what 
speech (or even point of view) the university expresses as an institution, distinct from 
those of individual faculty, students, or administrators. Moreover, while the right to 
institutional academic freedom has risen at the time in our history when universities have 
been most subject to federal regulation, no federal regulation has been invalidated under 
the right. As in Sweezy and Keyishian, the new tum in academic freedom has flowered 
in dicta and rhetoric more than in holdings and rules. 
75. Id. 
76. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
77. 454 U.S. 263, 277-81 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated: 
In this case, I agree with the Court that the university has not established a sufficient 
justification for its refusal to allow the Cornerstone group to engage in religious worship 
on the campus. The primary reason advanced for the discriminatory treatment is the 
University's fear of violating the Establishment Clause. But since the record discloses no 
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allocati�n of a university's limited resources should be made "by 
academicians, not by federal judges," w ithout courts subjecting the 
institutions to the exacting scrutiny required for a showing of a "compel­
ling state interest. "78 
In Widmar, the Court was asked to determine whether the University 
of Missouri at Kansas C ity, a state university, violated the First Amend­
ment rights to freedom of speech and association of an evangelical 
religious Christian student group by prohibiting the group's continued use 
of University facilities for meetings.79 This case arose from the 
University's interpretation of a regulation that "prohibit[ed] the use of 
University buildings or grounds 'for purposes of religious worship or 
religious teaching. rnao The University argued, pursuant to the regulation, 
that giving the group access to its facilities would violate the Establish­
ment Clause.81 Applying the strict scrutiny test,12 Justice Powell initially 
focused on the administrative nature of the University's regulation. 83 He 
noted that the purpose of the University was to "provide a forum in 
which students can exchange ideas. "8• As such, the use of the forum for 
religious spe;ch would neither advance nor inhibit the group's religious 
· activities.8 Further, he concluded that continued access to the Universi­
ty's facilities would not contribute to "an excessive government entangle­
ment with religion."86 As a result, Justice Powell concluded that the 
University would not violate the Establishment Clause by giving the 
group continued access to its facilities. 87 
danger that the University will appear to sponsor any particular religion, and since student 
participation in the Cornerstone meetings is entirely voluntary, the Court properly 
concludes that the University's fear is groundless. 
Id. at 280-81. 
78. Id. at 279. 
79. See id. at 265. 
80. Id. at 265. 
8 1 .  See id. at 270-71 .  Th e  Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution provides that 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
82. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70. · 
In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum based on the religious 
content of a group's intended speech, the University must therefore satisfy the standard 
of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
end. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
83. See id. at 270-75. 
84. Id. at 271 n.10. 
85. See id. at 271 -72 n. 1 0. 
86. Id. at 271 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted)). 87. See id. 
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Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's decision in Widmar 
because the University failed to offer any legitimate reasons why the use 
of University facilities by a religious student group would trigger a 
possible infringement of the Establishment Clause by the University;88 
however, he clearly acknowledged that "every university must 'make 
academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources. "'89 
Routine administrative decisions regarding ''the use of the time and space 
that is available for extracurricular activities" should be insulated from 
the Court's exacting scrutiny.90 
b. Academic Decisions 
With respect to decisions made in an academic context, there is a 
growing line of cases evidencing the judiciary's willingness to apply the 
standard adopted by the Court in Regents of the University of Michigan 
v. Ewing,91 and thus to defer to the decision-making authority of 
88. See id. at 280-81 (Stevens, J., concurring). Professor William W. Van Alstyne writes: 
A concurring opinion in Widmar by Justice Stevens makes a point not in disagreement 
with Powell's majority opinion, but qualifying it in a manner anticipating his own applied 
usage of "academic freedom" in Ewing. Stevens expressly referred to "academic 
freedom" to disallow intrusive judicial review of institutional procedures for handling 
disputes in allocating university space. In Stevens' view, the first amendment may shelter 
on-campus free speech and meeting rights of students at public institutions. Even so, he 
insisted, where such groups seek use of facilities, the first amendment does not require 
suspension of institutional opinion respecting their relative academic worthiness-at least 
in mediating competing demands, if not in judging their general "right" to be on campus. 
Rather, the first amendment specifically protects academic value judgments reflected in 
institutional mechanisms established to determine priorities of use where not all requests 
can simultaneously be granted. In Stevens' view, institutional discretion of this sort is not 
different in kind than the sort Powell embraced for the Court in the Bakke case. It is 
correspondingly entitled to a strong measure of academic freedom respect in the courts. 
Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 142. 
89. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion). 
90. Id. at 278. 
9 1 .  474 U.S. 214 (1985). 
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educational institutions.92 Although not absolute, judicial deference has 
been afforded in two limited contexts. 
First, in cases challenging admissions and retention decisions, courts 
have expressed a reluctance· to interfere with academic decisions made by 
a university.93 Ewing is the seminal case on this issue. In Ewing, the 
plaintiffs primary complaint was that the University arbitrarily evaluated 
his academic credentials when determining his fitness to remain in 
school.94 The plaintiff, Ewing, alleged that he had a property interest in 
continued enrollment in the medical school, and that the University,s 
decision to dismiss him violated his "'substantive due process rights, 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth AmendmenC,gs The Supreme Court 
concluded that even if the plaintiff had a protectible property interest in 
continued enrollment in medical school, the Court was reluctant to 
interfere with the University's decision to dismiss him from its accelerat­
ed program.96 Because Ewing alleged an infringement of a constitutional­
ly protected interest, however, the Court evaluated the University's 
conduct to determine if Ewing,s dismissal was the product of "arbitrary 
state action.',g7 The Court's decision was based on a number of factors, 
including a finding that Ewing's dismissal was not the result of arbitrari­
ness, but in fact was the product of conscientious and careful delibera­
tions by the faculty "based on an evaluation of the entirety of Ewing's 
Id. 
92. Byrne, supra note 41,  at 326-27. Byrne states that 
[t]he constitutional right of institutional academic freedom appears to be a collateral 
descendent of the common law notion of academic abstention. This heritage is made 
explicit in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, where the Court, after 
invoking Horowitz and the rhetoric of abstention, suggests that these views recommend 
themselves as protection for academic freedom. And the "four freedoms" of Sweezy 
reflect the kinds of university decisions courts have refused to review under common law 
principles. Institutional academic freedom can be viewed as academic abstention raised 
to constitutional status, so that judges can consider whether statutes or regulations fail to 
give sufficient consideration to the special needs or prerogatives of the academic com­
munity. 
93. See, e.g., Van de Zilver v. Rutgers Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925 (D.N.J. 1997); Phelps v. 
Washburn Univ., 634 F .  Supp. 556 (D. Kan. 1986); Montana v. Pantzer 489 P.2d 375 (Mont. 197 1 ). 
This position is consistent with Justice Powell's concurring opinion in B�rd of Curators v. Horowitz, 
435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("University faculties must have the widest range 
of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement 
to promotion or graduation."). 
94. 474 U.S. at 225. 
95. Id. at 217. 
96. See id. at 225-28; see also Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90 ("Like the decision of an individual 
professor as to the �roper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a 
stud�nt for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative infonnation and is not readtly adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking."). 97. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 224-25. 
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academic career."98 Such academic decision-making was insulated from 
judicial scrutiny because of two considerations. First, the Court deferred 
to the faculty's exercise of its "professional judgment. "99 Justice Stevens 
concluded that in the absence of "a substantial departure from accepted 
academic norms," judicial restraint should be exercised in these matters. 100 
Second, Justice Stevens, citing Sweezy, Keyishian, and Bakke, acknowl­
edged the Court's reluctance to substitute its judgment for the educational 
expertise utilized in the academic decision-making process. 101 He 
acknowledged 
a reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational 
institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom, "a 
special concern of the First Amendment." If a "federal court is not the 
appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personal decisions that 
are made daily by public agencies" far less is it suited to evaluate the substance 
of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members 
of public educational institutions-decisions that require an expert evaluation 
of  cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools 
o f  judicial or administrative decision-making. 102 
In addition to Supreme Court decisions, lower federal courts also have 
recognized the doctrine of institutional autonomy and the importance of 
an educational institution's right to exercise its First Amendment rights 
in the selection of its student body. In Martin v. Helstad, 103 the District 
Court of Wisconsin, citing Bakke and Sweezy, held that "[a]cademic 
institutions are accorded great deference in their freedom to determine 
who may be admitted to study at the institution. As long as admission 
standards remain within constitutionally permissible parameters, it is 
98. Id. at 225. 
99. Id. 
1 00. Id. 
10 1 .  See id. at 226. Justice Stevens concluded that "[a)cademic freedom thrives not only on the 
independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students but also, and somewhat 
inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself." Id. at 226 n.12 (citation 
omitted). But see Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: 0 Say, 
Does That Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 WAYNE L. REv. I, 1 7  (1993). 
Professor Heirs argues that "[w )hen Justice Stevens used the expression 'autonomous decision-making 
by the academy itself,' he was obviously referring to decision-making by the faculty." Id. He further 
argues that with respect to conflicting rights of the faculty and the university, "[t)he notion that 
academic institutions are somehow endowed with an 'academic freedom' to restrict or punish the 
exercise of academic freedom by their faculty is aberrant." Id. at 5 5 .  
102. Ewing, 414 U.S. at 226 (alteration in  original) (citations omitted). In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Powell echoed the Court's "emphasis on the respect and deference that courts should accord 
academic decisions made by the appropriate university authorities." Id. at 230 (Powell, J., 
concurring). He went on to conclude that "[j)udicial review of academic decisions, including those 
with respect to the admission or dismissal of students, is rarely appropriate, particularly where orderly 
administrative procedures are followed." Id. 
103 .  578 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wis. 1983). 
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exclusively within the province of higher educational institutions to 
establish criteria for admission."104 
In Martin, the University of Wisconsin had revoked the acceptance of 
an applicant who was convicted and incarcerated for interstate transporta­
tion of forged securities. ios Although required to do so, the applicant had 
failed to include this infonnation about his criminal conviction on his 
application to law school.106 The plaintiff challenged the revocation as 
a violation of his due process and equal protection rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.107 The court, however, recognized that the 
University's academic freedom to select its student body diminished any 
private property interest that Martin had in attending law school and 
granted the University of Wisconsin School of Law's motion for 
summary judgment. 1 08 
Federal courts also have evidenced a willingness to defer to the 
decision-making authority of academic institutions in the area of 
discrimination claims based on disability. 109 For example, in Anderson 
v. University of Wisconsin, 1 10 an alcoholic law student challenged the 
University of Wisconsin Law School's decision not to readmit him for a 
fourth time.1 11  Anderson alleged that the University dismissed him 
because of his alcoholism in violation of section 504 of the Rehabil itation 
104. Id. at 1482 (citations omitted). 
105. See id. at 1478. 
1 06. See id. at 1475-76. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. at 1485; see also Wirsing v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 739 F. Supp. 
551 (D. Colo. 1990). In Wirsing, the court held that requiring a tenured professor to comply with 
the University of Colorado at Denver's requirement that she administer standardized teaching 
evaluations in her classes did not interfere with her right to academic freedom under the First 
Amendment. Id. at 553-54. Instead, the court noted the countervailing institutional autonomy 
enjoyed by the University to govern the institution. See id. at 553. "Because the university must 
remain independent and autonomous to enjoy academic freedom, the federal courts are reluctant to 
interfere in the internal daily operations of the academy which do not directly and sharply implicate 
basic constitutional values." Id. 
109. See Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. o f  Va., 967 F. Supp. 882, 886 (W.D. Va. 
1997). 
The first of these is a court's limited ability, as contrasted to that of experienced 
educational administrators and professionals, to determine an applicant's qualifications and 
whether he or she would meet reasonable standards for academic and professional 
achievement established by a university . . . . "Courts are particularly ill-equipped to 
evaluate academic performance." 
Id. (quoting Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1978)) (omission 
in original); see also Mallett v. Marquette Univ., 65 F.3d 1 70, 1995 WL 508104, at •3 (7th Cir. 
199�) �unpublished opinio�) (fi?ding that law school applicant was not "otherwise qualified" for 
adm1ss1on to Marquette University Law School notwithstanding his disability). 
1 1 0. 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988). 
1 1 1 .  See id. at 739. 
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Act. 1 1 2 The Rehabilitation Act provides that "an institution receiving 
federal funds may not discriminate against an 'otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual. "' 1 13 The district court granted the University's 
motion for summary judgment upon concluding, as the University did, 
that Anderson was "not 'otherwise qualified' to continue as a law 
student" because of his poor academic performance. 1 14 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in response to Anderson's argument 
that a j ury should be allowed to reach the final disposition of the case, 
noted that, consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions 
in Ewing• 15 and Horowitz, 1 1 6 judicial deference was the more appropriate 
response to this action. 1 17 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
[t]he Act does not designate a jury, rather than the faculty of the Law School, 
as the body to decide whether a would-be student is up to snuff. The Law 
School may set standards for itself, and jurors unacquainted with the academic 
program of a law school could not make the readmissions decision more 
accurately than the faculty of the Law School; the process of litigation would 
change the substantive standard in addition to raising the costs of its applica­
tion. 1 1 1 
The S ixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Doherty v. Southern 
College of Optometry. 1 19 In Doherty, the plaintiff, an optometry student, 
suffered from a debilitating eye condition known as "retinitis pigmentosa 
(RP) and an associated neurological condition. "1 20 In order to advance 
into his fourth year of the program, the plaintiff was required to pass a 
pathology clinic examination that required him to perform several manual 
techniques with proscribed instrumentation. 12 1 Due to his physical 
condition, the plaintiff was unable to successfully complete this examina­
tion, and was therefore denied a degree. 122 The S ixth C ircuit affirmed the 
district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs discrimination claim because 
the University could not "reasonably accommodate" his disability. 123 
Additionally, in response to his breach of contract claims, the Sixth 
Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning from Ewing and Horowitz 
1 12.  See id. 
1 13. Id. at 740 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794). 
1 1 4 .  Id. 
1 1 5.  Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 2 1 4  ( 1 985). 
1 1 6. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1978). 
1 1 7. See Anderson, 841 F.2d at 74 1 .  
1 1 8 .  Id. 
1 1 9. 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988). 
120. Id. at 572. 
1 2 1 .  See id. 
122. See id. at 572-73. 
1 23. Id. at 575. 
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and expressed a reluctance to interfere with competency decisions made 
by academic institutions. 124 The Sixth Circuit noted that 
this case arises in an academic context where judicial intervention in any fonn 
should be undertaken only with the greatest reluctance. The federal judiciary 
is ill equipped to evaluate the proper emphasis and content of a school's 
curriculum. This is the case especially regarding degree requirements in the 
health care field when the conferral of a degree places the school's imprimatur 
upon the student as qualified to pursue his chosen profession. m 
The Sixth Circuit ultimately concluded that the University did not breach 
any express or implied contractual agreements with the plaintiff, and 
therefore set aside the district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff 
on this issue. 126 
The second context in which federal courts have evidenced a willing­
ness to defer to the decision-making authority of academic institutions is 
with respect to faculty retention decisions. Although the Supreme Court 
has broadly interpretea the scope of academic freedom protections for 
faculty and students, this is an area within the academy where institution­
al autonomy reigns supreme over those fundamental First Amendment 
rights. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Hetrick v. Martin121 held that 
Eastern Kentucky University did not violate the First Amendment rights 
of an untenured faculty member when the University failed to renew her 
contract due to its "displeasure with her pedagogical attitudes."128 The 
court held that the scope of a teacher's right to academic freedom did not 
"encompass the right of a nontenured teacher to have her teaching style 
insulated from review by her superiors when they determine whether she 
has merited tenured status just because her m ethods and philosophy are 
considered acceptable somewhere within the teaching profession."129 The 
Sixth Circuit, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Board 
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 130 concluded that in the absence of 
a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, a university has the 
authority to terminate a nontenured faculty member without articulation 
of a statement of reasons for such action, notice, or a hearing.13 1 The 
court noted that a contrary decision would subject educational institutions 
to legal action with "every nonrenewal decision."132 
I 24. See id. at 576. 
125. Id. (citations to Ewing and Horowitz omitted). 
1 26. See id. at 579. 
127.  480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973). 
128. Id. at 708. 
1 29. Id. at 709. 
130. 408 U.S. 564 ( 1 972). 
1 3 1 .  See Hetrick, 480 F .2d at 709. 
132. Id. 
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Similarly, the First Circuit i n  Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts 
University133 held that the University did not interfere with an untenured 
faculty member's academic freedom when it refused to renew his 
contract. 134 The faculty member argued that the University retaliated 
against him for his refusal to "inflate his grades or lower his expectations 
and teaching standards."135 The First Circuit emphasized that the 
University had a recognized right to govern the institution pursuant to the 
"four essential freedoms"136 as set forth in Sweezy and Bakke, and that 
such rights superseded any rights to academic freedom asserted by the 
faculty member in this situation. 137 As a result, the University was 
entitled to establish and implement policies regarding "course content, 
homework load, and grading. " 138 It was also within the University's 
discretion to determine whether it "sets itself up to attract and serve only 
the best and brightest students or whether it instead gears its standard to 
a broader, more average population. "139 In the absence of such institu­
tional autonomy, the court concluded that the University would be 
constrained from "defining and performing its educational mission."140 
Even though a few circuits are outspoken on this issue, the doctrine of 
institutional autonomy is in an embryonic state. The expansion of First 
Amendment protection to academic decision-making, however, is 
consistent with the deferential treatment afforded by the Supreme Court 
to the ideas and conduct of individual members of the academic 
community. Protection of this community as a "marketplace of ideas" 
requires the Court to recognize the unique nature and complexity of this 
environment. The foundation of academic decision-making is the 
professional judgment and expertise utilized by its members. The 
judiciary is ill-equipped to evaluate the merits of these informed 
decisions. Judicial interference in this process would subject members of 
the academic community to unwarranted litigation, and hamper their 
ability to act in the best interests of their educational institutions. 
Recognition of the doctrine of institutional autonomy ensures members 
of the academy that their educational decision-making will be insulated 
by the First Amendment from unwarranted constitutional scrutiny. 
133. 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986). 
134. See id. at 426. 
135. Id. at 425. 
136. Id. at 426 (quoting Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 ( 1957), as stating that 
the "four essential freedoms" of a university are "to determine for itself on academic grounds who 
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study"). 
137. See id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 425·26. 
140. Id. at 426. 
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B. The Attainment of Diversity as a Permissible Exercise of 
Academic Freedom 
[Vol. 47 
The modem trend toward adoption of the "four essential freedoms" 
identified in Sweezy was set forth by Justice Powell in Bakke. 14 1  
Specifically, Justice Powell noted that "[t]h e  freedom of a university to 
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its 
student body."142 It is through this exercise of a free selection process 
that Justice Powell detennined that the "attainment of a diverse student 
body"143 was a constitutionally pennissible justification for the use of 
race-based admissions criteria. 144 
During the twenty-year period between the Bakke decision and the 
Fifth Circuit's explicit rejection of Justice Powell's diversity justification 
in Hopwood v. State of Texas, 145 two lower courts held that the use of 
race-based preferences by educational institutions was constitutionally 
permissible. In Davis v. Halpern, 146 the United States District C ourt for 
the Eastern District of New York accepted as controlling precedent 
Justice Powell's view that the use of racial preferences to achieve 
diversity was a constitutionally pennissible goal capable of withstanding 
the strict scrutiny analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. 147 In Davis, a 
white male applicant to the City University of New York (CUNY) law 
school challenged the University's numerous rejections of his application 
1 4 1 .  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 3 1 1 - 1 5  (1978) (opinion of Powell, 
J.). 
142. Id. at 3 12. 
143. Id. at 3 1 1 . 
144. See id. at 3 1 1-12. But see DARIEN A MCWHIRTER, THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 
WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 1 50 (1996). McWhirter states: 
Id. 
It is important to remember why Justice Powell allowed diversity to rule in the area of 
college admission. It was not only to help minority students, although that was certainly 
part of the equation. The stated purpose of diversity on state college campuses was to 
provide a more diverse educational environment for everyone, minority and nonminority 
alike. Given an Ivy League setting, the purpose of diversity is to ensure that white 
students who never attended a school with blacks or Hispanics can observe them for a 
while close up before they have to work with them out there in the real world. 
145. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); see a/Jo discussion supra notes J 84-97 and accompanying text. 
146. 768 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). Several federal and state courts have adopted Justice 
Powell's analysis in Bakke. See, e.g., Smith v. University of Wash. Law Sch., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1 324, 
1 334-35 (W.D. Wash. 1998); University and Community College Sys. ofNev. v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 
730, 734-35 (Nev. 1 997); DeRonde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 625 p .2d 220 224-25, 227 (Cal. 
1981� • • 
147. See Davis, 768 F. Supp. at 975. 
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as violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of  1 964. 148 The applicant 
alleged that pursuant to the school's affinnative action policy, race and 
gender were considered as factors in the admissions process. 149 
The University asserted that these factors were used to recruit a 
diversified student body. 150 Specifically, CUNY's Statement of Admis­
sions Policy, which was set forth in the school's admissions catalogue, 
provided that the University's goal was to "select a diverse group of 
students, genuinely representative of the remarkable diversity of the City 
the School serves."15 1 The district court's decision in this case represents 
one of the few instances in which a federal court fully adopted Justice 
Powel l 's  assertion that the attainment of a diverse student body can serve 
as a compelling justification for the use of race-based criteria. The court, 
citing Bakke, noted that 
[w]hile the use of racial classifications are highly disfavored and have been 
infrequently sustained by the Supreme Court, there arc instances in which 
classifications serving proper purposes will be upheld. One such purpose is that 
of a university's obtaining the benefits which flow from enrolling an ethnically 
diverse student body. is2 
The court further recognized the existence of a nexus between the First 
Amendment and diversity within an educational environment, but like 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, it failed to fully explore the justifica­
tions for such a connection. The Davis court merely recited Justice 
Powell 's  conclusion that "the First Amendment interest in providing an 
environment which fosters the 'robust exchange of ideas' makes the goal 
of diversity 'of paramount importance in the fulfil lment of [a universi­
ty's] m ission."'m 
The court noted that the University's use of racial preferences to 
achieve diversity was consistent with the "Harvard Plan," approved by 
148. Id. at 970; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4a (1994) "No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded ftom participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Bakke, 42 
U .S.C. § 2000d prohibits any discriminatory conduct that also violates the equal protection guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ba/eke, 438 U.S. at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
149. See Davis, 768 F. Supp. at 974. 
150. See id. at 980. 
151 .  Id. 
1 52. Id. at 975. 
However, Bakke makes clear that in the absence of prior discrimination by the university 
the consideration of race as one factor among many by a university admissions process 
is constitutional only so far as it seeks to procure for the university the educational 
benefits which flow from having a diverse student body. 
Id. at 98 1 .  
1 53. Id. at 975. 
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Justice Powell in Bakke. 1s4 Although an admissions policy that adopts 
this structure may appropriately place "a premium on membership in 
certain ethnic groups," and use this as "a perfectly appropriate, and legal, 
means to achieve d iversity," such a policy violates the Equal Protection 
Clause if it is used as a remedial measure in the absence of a "proper 
showing of discrim ination."1s.s Although the tenor of this opinion is 
clearly supportive of diversity within the academy, it is clear that the 
court was hampered by the University's failure to justify its admissions 
policy with rationales that are consistent with Justice Powell's definition 
of diversity. Instead, the district court concluded that 
[t]he fact that the City and State are ethnically diverse, the fact that the Bar may 
be too homogeneous,· or the fact that minorities too often may not be able to 
find adequate legal representation cannot alone or in combination with one 
another, without more, support the consideration of race by the law school. The 
law school's remedial powers are limited, under the Equal Protection Clause, 
to addressing such discrimination as it specifically finds to have been perpetuat­
ed by its own institutions-not by our society at large. 156 
In addition to seeking a diversified student body, CUNY's race-based 
admissions criteria also was viewed as a remedial measure to diversify· 
the New York bar due to underrepresentation of minorities, and to train 
minority attorneys so that they would be available to assist underserved 
minority communities. 157 The court, however, also made clear that 
remedial measures, even those aimed at achievement of diversity, must 
be justified by a proper showing of past d iscrimination, and that no such 
showing was made by the University in thi s  case. 158 The court n oted that 
ifthe University's policy was aimed at remedying societal discrim ination, 
"then it is unconstitutional for its failure to be limited to the goal of 
remedying specific prior discriminatory practices by the law school."159 
The court further determined that the University's admissions policy 
unfortunately confused or merged ''the goal of diversity, whose intent 
154. See id. at 982. The Harvard Plan is a common reference to the special admissions plan 
adopted by Harvard College. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 273, app. at 322-23 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
155. Davis, 768 F. Supp. at 982. 
156. Id. at 981. 
157. See id. at 980. The University's Director of Admissions stated that 
Id. 
(b ]ecause minorities and other groups are underrepresented in the legal profession and 
because of the diverse composition of New York City and State and the Law School's 
commitment to diversity in its student body, membership in underrepresented groups is 
one of several factors, such as GPA and LSAT scores, which Committee members may 
consider, in determining an applicant's request for admission. 
1 58. See id. at 980-81 ("Neither side in this case has proffered a shred of evidence suggesting 
that the law school has ever engaged in discrimination against those underrepresented groups."). 
159. Id. at 980. 
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is to cultivate a richer academic environment, with that of the remedial 
consideration of race and ethnicity, which [was impermissibly] directed 
at addressing the inadequate minority representation in the legal 
profession."160 As a result of the University's failure to present any 
evidence of past discriminatory conduct that would 'justify a race­
conscious remedy under Title VI," the district court determined that a 
triable issue of fact remained regarding the constitutional permissibility 
of the University's policies. 16 1 
Another case that adopted the attainment of diversity as a constitution­
ally permissible justification for the use of race-based preferences is 
McDonald v. Hogness. 162 In McDonald, an unsuccessful white male 
applicant challenged the admissions policies of the University o f  
Washington School of Medicine on several constitutional and statutory 
grounds. 163 The Medical School's admissions policy considered a number 
of factors, including "academic performance, medical aptitude, motiva­
tion, maturity, and demonstrated humanitarian qualities. Extenuating 
background circumstances are considered as they relate to these selection 
factors. "164 The University considered race or ethnicity as a positive 
factor in this process. 165 
The University argued, in accordance with Sweezy and Keyishian, that 
the administration of its admissions policy was a constitutionally 
permissible exercise of academic freedom as protected by the First 
Amendment. 166 Although the court agreed that "a university must have 
wide discretion in making admission judgments," such discretion must be 
tempered by "'constitutional limitations protecting individual rights. "'167 
The constitutional limitation imposed by the Equal Protection Clause 
mandates compliance with the strict scrutiny test when evaluating the 
160. Id. 
161 .  Id. at 982-83. 
162. 598 P.2d 707 (Wash. 1979) (en bane). Initially, the court noted that the applicant was not 
entitled to relief on equal protection grounds because evidence showed that he would not have been 
admitted into the "class even absent the six minority persons accepted and without any consideration 
of race." Id. at 7 1 1 .. Because of the "public importance of the issue and the likelihood of its 
recurrence," however, the court considered the broader question of whether the use of race was a 
constitutionally permissible admissions factor. Id. 
163. See id. at 709 (restating the argument that the University engaged in racial discrimination 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, section 601 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
1 64. Id. 
1 65.  See id. at 714. 
166. The University relied on Justice Frankfurter's argument in Sweezy to argue that the denial 
of the plaintiff's application "was an exercise of its constitutionally protected freedom to decide who 
shall be admitted to study." Id. at 7 1 3  n.7. 
167. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (opinion of 
Powell, J.)). 
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constinitionality of race-based selection criteria. 161 In this regard, the 
Washington Supreme C ourt adopted Justice Powell's conclusion that the 
attainment of a diverse student body is a compelling justification for the 
use of racial selection criteria. 169 The attainment of a diverse student 
body was viewed by the court as a permissible method of promoting an 
atmosphere of "speculation, experimentation and creation."170 The court 
noted that "[i]n applying his test, Mr. Justice Powell characterizes the 
goal of the attainment of a diverse student body as compelling, stressing 
that the freedom to select a student body is an element of academic 
freedom."171 Because the finding of fact that the University's purpose 
underlying the use of the racial criteria as a means of promoting diversity 
in the student body172 was unchallenged by the applicant, 173 the Washing­
ton Supreme Court held that the use of such criteria was in conformity 
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 174 
In McDonald, the University's use of racial classifications is analogous 
to the use of such c lassifications in Bakke. m In accordance with the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the strict scrutiny test, notwithstanding 
the constitutionality of the purpose underlying the race-based classifica­
tion, a court also may find a violation of the Equal Protection C lause if 
the race-based classification is not "necessary to the accomplishment of 
[the] purpose." 176 This tailoring of the classification to fit its i ntended 
purpose was clearly established in McDonald. The court noted the 
similarities in administration between the University of Washi ngton 's 
admissions program and the program cited with approval by Justice 
168. See id. 
1 69. See id. 
170. Id. 
1 7 1 .  Id. at 712. 
1 72. See id. at 713 n.7 ( .. We agree that in seeking diversity, the U.W. medical school must be 
viewed 'as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its 
mission."'). 
173. See id. at 713 n.8. 
174. See id. at 715. The court noted: 
In dicta, Mr. Justice Powell indicates that the Harvard admission plan, which like the plan 
here employs race as an admission factor, furthers a compelling state interest in diversity 
of the student body. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun also found the 
Harvard plan constitutional under their approach. Thus, a majority of the court find 
constitutional a plan without a quota or separate consideration for minority groups but 
where race may be a beneficial factor. The University of Washington School of 
Medicine's admission policies and procedures have the same redeeming characteristics. 
Id. at 713 (citations omitted). 
175. The McDonald court, citing Justice Powell's analysis of the race-based admissions criteria 
in Bakke, noted that "a program under which race is but one factor in achieving diversity" would 
survive the tailoring requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 714. 
176. Id. 
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Powell in Bakke.177 The McDonald court, citing with approval Justice 
Powel l 's position, stated that 
this diversity encompasses a broad array of qualifications and characteristics of 
which racial origin is a single element. [Justice Powell] concludes from the 
experience of other university admission programs which take race into account 
in achieving diversity that the assignment of a fixed number of places to a 
minority group is not necessary. 171 
The court believed that the University of Washington's admission plan 
had the same redeeming characteristics as the Harvard Plan, ''which like 
the p lan here employs race aS an admission factor, furthers a compelling 
state interest in diversity of the student body."179 
To date, the strongest judicial opposition to the use of race-based 
affirmative action programs to attain a diverse student body has come out 
of the Fifth Circuit. In Hopwood v. Texas, 180 the Fifth Circuit prohibited 
the University of Texas School of Law from using race or ethnicity as a 
factor in the selection of applicants, effectively terminating the affirma­
tive action program.181 The court rejected the University's argument that 
the goal of attaining a diverse student body was a compelling government 
interest capable of satisfying the constitutional scrutiny imposed by the 
Equal Protection Clause. 182 The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded by the 
University's reliance on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, 183 and in fact, 
1 77. See id. at 713. 
1 78. Id. (citation omitted). 
1 79. Id. at 713.  
1 80. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1 996). For a critical analysis of the Hopwood opinion, see Michael 
A. Olivas, The Decision Is Flatly, Unequivocally Wrong, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Mar. 29, 1996, at 
83. 
1 8 1 .  Note District Court Judge Sparks's prophetic remarks: 
The Court believes such meager representation would be woefully inadequate in a state 
university supported, in part, by revenues from all state residents. Further, the Court 
concurs with the defendants that diversity requires more than token representation of 
minorities; strict reliance on the Tis for admission would not further the goal of diversity. 
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 551,  571 n.60 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev 'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
Id. 
1 82. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. 
1 83. The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood held: 
We agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school 
for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote 
and has never represented the view o f  a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case. 
Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding education state that non­
remedial state interests will never justify racial classifications. 
Fifth Circuit Judge Wiener, however, disagreed with the majority's conclusion regarding this issue. 
See id. at 962 (Wiener, J., concurring). Judge Wiener's rejection of the majority's opinion on this 
issue was the result of three primary factors. First, he concluded that the Supreme Court's decision 
in Adarand offered "minimal guidance" in detennining whether to apply the strict scrutiny test to 
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specifically rejected it, stating: "Justice Powell 's  view in Bakke is not 
binding precedent on this issue."184 
The court in Hopwood addressed several problems associated with the 
use of racial or ethnic classifications to attain a diverse student body. 185 
It initially expressed its reliance on the Supreme Court's decisions in City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company116 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 187 and thus concluded that these cases serve as the basis for the 
Supreme Court's mandate that the use of race-based preferences to 
achieve diversity is not a compelling interest that can satisfy the strict 
race-based classifications. Id at 964-65. Second, he argued that Hopwood could be decided on 
narrower grounds without reaching the broader constitutional issues. See id. at 966. He noted that 
the special admissions program utilized by the University was constitutionally invalid because it was 
not narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of attaining a diverse student body. See id. Judge Wiener 
wrote that the University's special admissions program "more closely resembles a set aside or quota 
system for those two disadvantaged minorities [blacks and Hispanics] than it does an academic 
admissions program narrowly tailored to achieve true diversity." Id. 
1 84. Id. at 944. ("While [Justice Powell] announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that 
part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale . . . .  As the Adarand Court states, the Bakke 
Court did not express a majority view and is questionable as binding precedent."). Fifth Circuit 
Judge Wiener recognized the premature nature of the majority's conclusion that Adarand overruled 
Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that race was a constitutionally permissible means of achieving 
diversity. See id. at 963 (Wiener, J., concurring). On the contrary, Judge Wiener wrote that the 
decision to overrule Bakke rests with the Supreme Court, and "not a three-judge panel o f  a circuit 
court." Id. He further argued: 
This conclusion may well be a defensible extension of recent Supreme Court precedent 
[Adarand], an extension which in time may prove to be the Court's position. It 
admittedly has a simplifying appeal as an easily applied, bright-line rule proscribing any 
use of race as a determinant Be that as it may, this position remains as extension o f  the 
law-one that, in my opinion, is both overly broad and unnecessary to the disposition of 
this case. 
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Michael Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science and 
Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher &Jucation, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 065, 1 09 1  (1997) 
(pointing out in very strong terms that Bakke remains binding precedent). 
1 85. For criticism of affirmative action, see Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity 
as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 123, 1 1 59 ( 1 997). Chen argues: 
Rather, my point is that the reification of racial identity, no Jess among nonwhites than 
among whites, has cloaked the affirmative action debate in the rhetoric of takings jurispru· 
dence. The transmogrification of race from a suspect classification to an accepted, even 
expected, foundation for the modem state's dazzling array of new property, from a 
deviant basis for decisionmaking to a quotidian category, bodes ill for real healing in a 
land so deeply scarred by the curse of race. 
Id. at 1 159 . 
. 
1 86: 1!opwood,_ 78 F .3d . at 944_-45 ("Indeed, recent Supreme Court precedent shows that the 
d1vers1ty interest wtll not satisfy stnct scrutiny. Foremost, the Court appem to have decided that 
there is essentially only one compelling state interest to justify racial classifications: remedying past 
wrongs."). 
1 87. Id. at 944 ("As the Adarand Court states, the Bakke Court did not express a majority view 
and is questionable as binding precedent"). 
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scrutiny analysis mandated by the Equal Protection Clause. 111 The Fifth 
Circuit held that "remedyin g  past wrongs" was the only compelling state 
interest that could justify the use of race-based classifications, 189 then set 
forth a number of reasons why the pursuit of diversity is not a compelling 
state interest. 190 The court noted that diversity "contradicts, rather than 
furthers, the aims of equal protection. Diversity fosters, rather than 
minimizes, the use of race. It treats minorities as group, rather than as 
individuals. It may further remedial purposes but, just as likely, may 
promote improper racial stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility."191 The 
court further added that the use of race-based classifications to achieve 
diversity promotes stigmatization, 192 and "undercuts the ultimate goal of 
the Fourteenth Amendment: the end of racially-motivated state action."193 
Although the Fifth Circuit considered several arguments against the use 
of racial classifications to achieve diversity, the opinion does not fully 
address  the countervailing consideration of the University's right to 
exercise its institutional autonomy when selecting its student body. The 
Hopwood opinion briefly mentions Justice Powell ' s  reliance on the 
exerci se of institutional autonomy to achieve diversity as a constitutional­
ly permissible goal. 194 The court noted: 
Saying that a university has a First Amendment interest in this context is 
somewhat troubling. Both the medical school in Bakke and, in our case, the law 
school are state institutions. The First Amendment generally protects citizens 
from the actions of government, not government from its citizens. Significantly, 
Sweezy involved a person who was called before the Attorney General of New 
Hampshire to answer for alleged subversive activities. He declined on First 
Amendment grounds to answer questions about a lecture he had delivered at the 
University of New Hampshire. While Justice Frankfurter spoke of a 
university's interest in openness and free inqui�, it was plainly through the 
First Amendment rights of individual scholars.1 ' 
The Fifth Circuit thus dismissed the possibility that an institution can 
have any rights that are subject to the protection of the First Amendment 
guarantee of academic freedom without a thorough examination of these 
1 88. See id. at 944-45. 
1 89. Id. at 944. 
190. See id. at 945. Circuit Judge Wiener, specially concurring, disagreed with the Court's 
treatment of the argument that diversity could serve as a compelling state interest See id. at 962 
(Wiener, J., concurring) ("As to diversity, however, I respectfully disagree with the panel opinion's 
conclusion that diversity can never be a compelling governmental interest in a public graduate 
school."). 
1 9 1 .  Id. at 945. 
192. See id. at 946. 
193. Id. at 947-48. 
194. Id. at 942-43. 
195.  Id. at943 n.25 (citing Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 
354 U.S. 234, 262, 266-67 ( 1957)). 
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institutional rights. The Fifth Circuit stands alone in its rejection of 
diversity as a compell ing justification for the use of race-based selection 
criteria within the educational arena. 196 
In Bakke, Justice Powell concluded that the equal protection implica­
tions generated by the use of race-based classifications can be overcome 
by a determination that such use is necessary to achieve a diverse student 
body. 197 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell recognized that race 
and ethnicity are components of American society, and as such, are 
essential components of any effort to assemble a student body that is 
1 96. In a recent decision addressing this issue, the First Circuit in Wessmann v. Gittens implied 
that Hopwood's rejection of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke may have been "premature." 1 60 F.3d 
790, 796 (1st Cir. 1998). The First Circuit noted that "in the absence of a clear signal," presumably 
from the Court, that diversity is not a compelling justification, the First Circuit "assume[d] arguendo 
. . .  that Bakke remains good law and that some iterations of 'diversity' might be sufficiently 
compelling, in specific circumstances, to justify race-conscious actions." Id. The Wessman court, 
however, clearly did not decide the question of whether Bakke remains good law. See id. at 800 
("For purposes of resolving this appeal, however, we need not speak definitively to that vexing 
question."). 
In Wessmann, an unsuccessful white applicant to the Boston Latin Academy, a prestigious public 
school, argued that the Academy's use of race and ethnicity in its selection criteria violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. See id. at 7 1 3-94. Among other justifications, the Academy argued that its admis­
sions policy promoted a diverse student body. See id. at 796-97. The First Circuit concluded that 
the policy did not promote diversity, but on the contrary, was an impermissible "mechanism for racial 
balancing." Id. at 799. Additionally, the First Circuit concluded that the Policy focused "exclusively 
on racial and ethnic diversity," which was inconsistent with Justice Powell's broader definition of 
diversity within the academic environment. Id. at 798. Finally, the First Circuit noted the absence 
of a particularized showing that its admissions policy furthered their goal of attaining a diverse 
student body. See id. at 799-800. 
[T]he School Committee exhorts us to find that diversity is essential to the modem 
learning experience. Stated at this level of abstraction, few would gainsay the 
attractiveness of diversity. Encounters between students of varied backgrounds facilitate 
a vigorous exchange of ideas that not only nourishes the intellect, but also furthers mutual 
understanding and respect, thereby eroding prejudice and acting as a catalyst for social 
harmony. Indeed, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke acknowledges that these very 
attributes may render an educational institution's interest in promoting diversity 
compelling. In the last analysis, however, the School Committee's reliance on 
generalizations undercuts its construct. If one is to limit consideration to generalities, any 
proponent of any notion of diversity could recite a similar litany of virtues. Hence, an 
inquiring court cannot content itself with abstractions. Just as Justice Powell probed 
whether the racial classification at issue in Bakke in fact promoted the institution's stated 
goals, we must look beyond the School Committee's recital of the theoretical benefits of 
diversity and inquire whether the concrete workings of the Policy merit constitutional 
sanction. Only by such particularized attention can we ascertain whether the Policy bears 
any necessary relation to the noble ends it espouses. In short, the devil is in the details. 
Id. at 797-98. 
197. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978). 
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representative of that society. 198 He further recognized that the academic 
freedom guarantees of the First Amendment are so expansive as to 
protect the right of educational institutions to select a student body that 
would further this goal. Part III of this Article provides the constitutional 
framework for the nexus established by Justice Powell between diversity 
and the exercise of academic freedom. 
III. THE ACADEMIC NATURE OF EDUCATION AL DIVERSllY 
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was founded on the creation of a 
nexus between the traditional interpretations of the academic freedom 
doctrine and the goal of attainment of student body diversity. The 
viabi lity of this nexus, however, has been significantly limited by Justice 
Powell's failure to set forth the analytical paradigm upon which the nexus 
is based. 199 Because the attainment of a diverse student body is not 
possible in the absence of admissions policies designed to effectuate this 
goal, 200 Part III initially explores whether admissions decisions fall within 
Id. 
198. See id. at 291-95, 3 1 4; see also RUDENSTINE, supra note 38, at 1 -2. Rudenstine argues: 
We need to remind ourselves that student diversity has, for more than a century, been 
valued for its capacity to contribute powerfully to the process of learning and to the 
creation of an effective educational environment. It has also been seen as vital to the 
education of citizens-and the development of leaders-in heterogenous democratic 
societies such as our own. These overarching values have for many decades influenced 
our approach to admissions, and have provided the rationale for our basic policies. 
1 99. Professor Jim Chen argues that in the absence of an assertion that there is an academic 
basis for the use of race or ethnicity in selection criteria for students or faculty, "affirmative action 
in the name of diversity is content-based regulation of speech." Chen, supra note IS, at 1875. In 
this regard, the infringement of the academic freedom of students and faculty, Professor Chen argues, 
"outweighs the university's administrative interests." Id. ("Diversity-inspired educational affirmative 
action represents a conscious effort to shape the collective speech of a university. When government 
is 'attempting to control or direct the content of . . .  speech,' it cannot ask courts to defer to a 
university's institutional judgment in the name of 'academic freedom."' (quoting University of Pa. 
v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990))). 
It is the position of this author that there are academic justifications for the attainment of student 
body d iversity that outweigh any possible restrictions on educational speech. The impact of diversity 
on classroom pedagogy and discourse serves not to control but to enhance the quality of academic 
speech. Accordingly, the primary focus of this Article is to set forth academic justifications for the 
use of race-based admissions criteria by establishing a nexus between the attainment of student body 
diversity and the fulfillment of the traditional goals of educational institutions. 
200. This outcome is due, in part, to the use of numerical predictors, such as undergraduate 
GP As and standardized test scores, by admissions decision-makers to evaluate prospective applicants. 
Whether attributable to racism, cultural bias, or educational disadvantage, racial and ethnic minorities 
have achieved only marginal success in their pursuit of higher education. See generally SUSAN 
WELCH & JOHN GRUHL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY ENROLLMENTS IN MEDICAL AND LAW 
SCHOOLS ( 1998); Katherine Connor & Ellen J. Vargyas, The Legal Implications of Gender Bias in 
Standardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 13  (1992); Theodore Cross & Robert Bruce Slater, 
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the parameters of the academic decision-making process. The remaining 
portion of this section examines the impact of diversity on each of the 
traditional goals of educational institutions-teaching, inquiry, research 
and publication,2°1 thus establishing the basis for applying the academic 
freedom doctrine to protect the attainment of diversity as a function of 
academic decision-making. 
A. Admissions Decisions Are Exercises of Academic Decision-Making 
The doctrine of institutional autonomy is l imited in its applicability to 
"genuinely academic decisions."202 Although Justice Stevens in Ewing 
and Justice Powell in Bakke applied varying pennutations of the 
in.stitutional autonomy doctrine, neither Justice specifically defined the 
types of decisions that could be classified as academic. 203 As a result, 
there is no express standard for detennining whether the decision-making 
Special Report: Why the End of Affirmative Action Would Exclude All But a Very Few Blacks from 
America 's Leading Universities and Graduate Schools, J. BLACKS HIGHER Eouc., Autumn 1 997, at 
8; Edward J. Littlejohn & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Black Enrollment in law Schools: Forward to the 
Past?, 12 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 4 1 5  (1 987); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of 
Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 ( 1 996); Linda F. 
Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences 
of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997); 
SAT Scores Show Gains in Math, But Not in Literacy, STAR Tlue. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept 2, 
1 998, at 16A. 
20 1 .  See Finkin, supra note 13, at 846. 
Id. 
These opinions do hold open the prospect of a fuller integration of the idea of autonomy 
as part of a general theory of academic freedom . . . .  [T]he German idea [of academic 
freedom) was premised upon the university as a self-governing body of faculty. In 
America, [however,] "the university" encompasses a lay governing board and its 
administrative delegates to which the faculty is legally subordinate. Any reintegration of 
the two would have to take account of this difference. But neither opinion so much as 
hints at it. On the contrary, the Powell and Stevens opinions would protect as exercises 
of"academic freedom" decisions that are not necessarily related to content or methods of 
instruction, or to research, inquiry, and publication. In fact, the decisions they would 
insulate need not, and often are not, made by academics at all. 
202. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 2 14, 225 (1985). 
203. See Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 137. 
Id. 
Powell's use of"academic freedom" in Bakke, and his quotation of the dictum by Justice 
Frankfurter from the Sweezy case, represent no departure from the usages of academic 
freedom we have examined. When Powell writes of academic freedom as "long . . . 
vie�ed as a spec
_
ial concern of the First Amendment," his emphasis remains constant at 
all times. To gam purchase through the first amendment, the decision in any academic 
freedom case, whether individual or institutional, must still rest-as Frankfurter noted-on 
academic and not some other grounds. It is all the same moreover whether the decision 
pertains to "who may be admitted to study" rather th� to "who �ay teach," or "what 
may be taught," or "how." 
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engaged in by an educational institution is academic and thus protected 
by the First Amendment, or unprotected administrative decision-making. 
Due to the vast complexity of the decision-making process within an 
educational institution, articulation of a rigid standard is not desirable. 
The definition of an academic decision, therefore, must be a fluid 
paradigm, capable of adapting to the changing needs and influences of an 
educational institution. Although no express definition of an academic 
decision exists, the Supreme Court's decisions in this area offer guidance 
in the development of such a standard. 
1 .  Exercise of Professional Judgment 
The first prong of the standard that defines academic decision-making 
focuses on the expertise o f  the decision-maker. It is essential that the 
academic decision-maker possess a level of professional knowledge or 
expertise sufficient to give the judiciary enough confidence in the merit 
of the decision to warrant judicial deference. Reliance on the profession­
al judgment of members o f  the academy is consistent with the position 
adopted on several occasions by the Supreme Court. In Board of 
Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 204 Justice Rehnquist 
recognized the need for judicial deference to the University's dismissal 
of a medical student for inadequate perfonnance because the decision 
"require[ d] an expert evaluation of cumulative information. "205 Similarly, 
in Ewing, Justice Stevens counseled that when reviewing "the substance 
of a genuinely academic decision, . . .  [the judiciary] should show great 
respect for the faculty's professional judgment."206 
This component of the standard is not dependent on the title or status 
of the decision-maker as much as it is on the knowledge or skill applied 
by the decision-maker. For example, in Horowitz, the Court upheld the 
plaintiff's dismissal, which had been based in part on the inclusion of the 
faculty's professional judgment in the procedural mechanism used to 
evaluate her academic and clinical performance. 207 Throughout her tenure 
204. 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
205. Id. at 90; see also id. at 96 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring) ("University faculties must have the 
widest range of discretion in making judgements as to the academic performance of students and their 
entitlements to promotion or graduation."). 
206. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 ("Plainly, [judges] may not override [a genuine academic decision] 
unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the 
person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment"). 
207. See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80-82. A similar conclusion was reached by Justice Stevens in 
Ewing. See 474 U.S. at 225 ("Ewing's claim, therefore, must be that the University misjudged his 
fitness to remain a student in the Inteflex program. The record unmistakably demonstrates, however, 
that the faculty's decision was made conscientiously and with careful deliberation, based on an 
evaluation of the entirety of Ewing's academic career."). 
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in medical school, the plaintiff had received periodic performance 
evaluations from the "Council on Evaluation, a body composed of both 
faculty and students."201 Members of the faculty, who were physicians, 
reported repeated incidences of unsatisfactory clinical performance to the 
Council.209 The C ouncil ultimately recommended that the plaintiff be 
dismissed from school.2 10 Additional faculty members serving on the 
Coordinating Committee of the medical school reviewed the dismissal 
decision, and the Dean subsequently ratified the dismissal. 21 1 
As Horowitz illustrates, the level of expertise necessary for academic 
decision-making may be so specialized that it is inappropriate for judicial 
or administrative fact-finders to review the underlying merit of such 
decisions.212 Justice Rehnquist acknowledged as much in Horowitz when 
he stated that grading or disciplinary decisions are "not readily adapted 
to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking."213 
With respect to admissions decisions, Professor Matthew Finkin argues 
that "the Powell and Stevens opinions would protect as exercises of 
'academic freedom' decisions that are not necessarily related to content 
or methods of instruction, or to research, inquiry, and publication. In 
fact, the decisions that they would insulate need not, and often are not, 
made by academics at all."214 A recent survey of law school admissions 
programs indicates, however, that law schools utilize several types of 
admissions decision-making models, most of which include significant 
faculty participation.215 There is no doubt that the involvement of law 
208. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80. 
209. See id. at 80-82. 
210. See id. at 82. 
2 1 1 .  See id. 
212. See also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 344 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Courts 
are not educators; their expertise is limited . . . . "). 
213. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90; see also DeFunis, 416  U.S. at 325 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
Justice Douglas stated: 
The educational policy choices confronting a university admissions committee are not 
ordinarily a subject for judicial oversight; clearly it is not for us but for the law school 
to decide which tests to employ, how heavily to weigh recommendations from professors 
or undergraduate grades, and what level of achievement on the chosen criteria are 
sufficient to demonstrate that the candidate is qualified for admission. 
DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 325. 
214. Finkin, supra note 13, at 846. 
215. An unpublished survey of approximately 130 ABA law schools conducted by the Law 
School Admission Council in 1997 indicates that law schools utilize three primary types of 
admissions models. The most commonly used model is the "Presumptive Model." The major 
charactcristic
_
of�is model is that admissions files are placed in "presumptive admit or presumptive 
deny
_ 
cate�ones. i:iie �urvey responses indicate the presumptive categories are determined by 
consideration of pnmanly numerical predictors, such as LSAC index, LSA T scores, and 
undergraduate grade point averages. Applicants that do not fall within either presumptive category 
are forwarded to the admissions committee for 8 decision. There are two other admissions decision· 
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school faculty in the admi ssions process is significant for several reasons, 
the least of which involves the faculty's role as "academics." Most 
significantly, classroom experience exposes law faculty to a large variety 
of students with various ranges of intellectual abilities. This presents a 
unique opportunity for law faculty to identify potential characteristics that 
are necessary for a successful law school experience.216 This ability to 
recognize valued characteristics, such as maturity, analytical ability, 
academic potential, and verbal or written communications skills, cannot 
be ascertained from a review of numerical predictors whose validity 
recently has been called into question.217 In addition, law faculty seek 
making models that are used by the law schools responding to the LSAC survey. The "Sole Decider 
Model" relies on the dean or director of admission to make all decisions. "The decision-maker is 
also usually involved in setting enrollment and class diversity goals." Generally, the role of the 
admissions committee in a school utilizing this model is policy-making. Obviously, the nature of 
this model limits the extent of faculty involvement in the admissions decision-making process. The 
third type of admissions model used is the "Full Committee Review Model." This model is the most 
labor intensive model for faculty members. This model "places full responsibility for decision­
making on a faculty committee who divide and review all files, and in cases, meet as a committee, 
or a subcommittee, to make decisions." 
The survey responses indicate that 98% of the participating law schools have admissions 
committees. Fifty-three percent (53%) of the schools indicated that between 40-IOCWe of their total 
applications are reviewed by the committee. One hundred and ten law schools reported the presence 
of faculty on their committees, and 1 12 schools indicated that a faculty member chairs their 
committee. In addition to reading files and making admissions decisions, the admissions committees 
establishes policy and interview prospective candidates. 
Id. 
216. See Olivas, supra note 1 84, at 1 067. Olivas argues: 
Professional admissions decisions are crucial both to institutions and to students. 
Institutions care about the fit between students and the program, and, of course, every 
faculty member wants to teach the "best" students they can attract and enroll. Students, 
of course, want the best and most efficacious program .to which they can reasonably 
aspire. Therefore, institutions strive to adopt admissions criteria that accurately and 
reliably predict optimum performance in their programs. Schools seek both high scorers 
and those students whose academic predictors do not place them at the top end of their 
classes, but on whom the schools are willing to take modest risks that they can succeed. 
2 1 7. See generally Wightman, supra note 200, at 29. Wightman argues: 
The tension between commitment to the principles of racial and ethnic diversity and of 
competitive evaluation based on quantifiable indicators of individual achievement 
frequently results in questions about the appropriateness of the use of numerical 
indicators, especially the LSAT, in the admission process. These questions typically are 
raised by questioning the validity of the test, particularly the validity of its use with 
applicants of color. However, one does not need to argue that the test is invalid or a 
biased predictor against members of certain groups in order to substantiate the negative 
consequences of misuse or overuse of the test in the admission process. The LSAT is 
valid for a limited use and has a clearly defined, narrow focus: it is a test of acquired 
reading and verbal reasoning skills that have been shown to correlate with academic 
successes in the first year of law school. When it is used for a different and/or far 
broader purpose, not only is the use inappropriate, but calling on the test to do more than 
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students who have the potential to contribute to the academic vitality of 
their institution. 
Although faculty participation in the process can further institutional 
values as well as pedagogical concerns, it is important to recognize that 
other members of the institution who possess similar knowledge and 
expertise also could function as capable decision-makers. As long as the 
primary component of the academic decision-making stan­
dard-professional knowledge and expertis�is incorporated into the 
decision-making model, the first prong of the academic decision-making 
standard would be satisfied. 
2. Narrowly Define the Scope of Academic Decisions 
The second prong of the standard for determining whether the 
decision-making of an educational institution is academic or unprotected 
administrative decision-making focuses on the nature of the decision. 
Relying on the common meaning of "academic" narrows the definition 
of academic decision-making to issues pertaining to or concerning the 
primary function of the educational institution, which is "the pursuit of 
and dissemination of knowledge."218 The definition of an academic 
decision can be further refined by focusing on the traditional pedagogical 
goals of "teaching, inquiry, research, and publication."219 This standard 
is broad enough to encompass decisions relating to the essential core 
functions of an educational institution, yet narrow enough to exclude 
important, but nonessential decisions m ade within the context of the 
educational environment, such as the selection of a food service provider 
or team mascot. 
The Supreme Court has provided guidance in narrowing the parameters 
of an academic decision. Justice Powell, in  his concurring opinion in 
Ewing, referred to the admissions decision-making process as an 
it was intended to do damages its validity. 
Id. Also note that Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in DeFunis argued for the possible 
elimination of the LSAT as a predictor of minority perfonnance in law school due to certain inherent 
limitations in accounting for the impact of cultural differences. See DeFunis, 4 1 6  U.S. at 329 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). He theorized that "[t)here are many relevant factors, such as motivation, 
cultural backgrounds of specific minorities that the test can not measure, and they inevitably must 
impair its value as a predictor." Id. 
2 1 8. The word "academic" is defined as "of, or belonging to, or associated with an academy or 
school especially of higher learning." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 9 (1981). It further defines "school" as "an organized body of 
scholars and teachers associated for the pursuit of and dissemination of knowledge." Id. at 203 1 ;  see 
also B�me'.
su�ra note 41 ,  � 333 .<"And what are the indigenous values served by universities? First, the umvers1ty ts the preeminent institution in our society where knowledge and understanding are 
pursued with detachment or disinterestedness."). 
219. Finkin, supra note 13, at 829. 
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"academic decision."220 He noted that "Li]udicial review of academic 
decisions, including those with respect to the admission or dismissal of 
students, is rarely appropriate. "221 Justice Powell's  reference to admis­
sions and dismissal decisions within this context is consistent with his 
advocacy of institutional autonomy to protect the rights of an educational 
institution to select "who may be admitted to study."222 
Lower federal courts have adopted similar positions with respect to 
decisions affecting student grades. For instance, in Balisok v. Boutz, 223 
the Ninth Circuit noted that "[s]tudent grades and evaluations are 
academi c  decisions and as such are not generally appropriate for judicial 
review and interference unless they are 'a substantial departure from 
accepted academic nonns. "'224 Also, in McGregor v. Louisiana State 
University Board ofSupervisors,m the Fifth Circuit detennined that a law 
school ' s  refusal to advance a disabled law student to the second year o f  
law school was an academic decision. 226 The court held that ''the Law 
Center's decision to require full-time attendance and in-class examinations 
for first year students are academic decisions, ones which we find 
reasonable in light of the Law Center's admittance practices."227 
The definition of academic decisions has even been expanded to 
encompass issues affecting faculty. In Huang v. Board of Governors of 
the University of North Carolina,228 the Fourth Circuit held that the 
University's interderartment transfer of a tenured professor was an 
academic decision.22 The court noted that "[w]hen judges are asked to 
review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, 
220. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 230 (I  985) (Powell, J., concurring). 
221 .  Id. 
222. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 3 12  ( 1978) (citing Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)). 
223. 46 F.3d 1 138 (unpublished opinion), No. 93-35516, 1995 WL 23592, at •3 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(citing Ewing, 414 U.S. at 225-26); see also Kaltenberger v. Ohio College of Podiatric Med., 162 
F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1998). The Kallenberger court stated: 
The decision of the College not to waive this requirement [pennitting plaintiff to retake 
an examination after failing a course twice] and lower the standards for continuing 
training in podiatric medicine is entitled to deference. We should only reluctantly 
intervene in academic decisions .. especially regarding degree requirements on the health 
care field when the conferral of a degree places the school's imprimatur upon the student 
as qualified to pursue his chosen profession." 
162 F.3d at 437 (citing Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry. 862 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 
1988)). 
224. Ba/isok, 1995 WL 23592, at •3 (citing Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225-26). 
225. 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993). 
226. See id. at 859. 
227. Id. 
228. 902 F.2d 1 134 (4th Cir. 1 990). 
229. See id. at 1 142. 
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they should show great respect for the faculty's professionaljudgment."230 
The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar analysis in Wi//iams v. Texas Tech 
University Health Services Center,23 1 when it refused to interfere with the 
University's decision to reduce the salary of a tenured faculty member.232 
The court reiterated that judicial deference must be afforded to legitimate 
exercises of academic decision-making.233 
Obviously, this analysis does not offer a bright- line standard for 
distinguishing between academic and nonacademic decision-making. In 
fact, given the number and complexity of the educational environment, 
such a standard is not desirable. The academic decision-making model 
should be a fact-based continuum that offers guidance in determining the 
extent that such decision-making may be insulated from constitutional 
scrutiny. 
B. The Impact of Student Diversity on Each of the Traditional Goals 
of Educational Institutions-"Teaching, Inquiry, Research and 
Publication " 
Professor Matthew Finkin has argued that educational institutions have 
four primary goals: ''teaching, inquiry, research, and publication."234 The 
establishment of a nexus between admissions policies aimed at achieving 
student body diversity and these pedagogical goals is at the core of 
Justice Powell's willinP,ess to extend First Amendment protections to 
admissions decisions.23 Unfortunately, this task is made more daunting 
230. Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)). 
23 1 .  6 F.3d 290 (Sth Cir. 1993). 
232. See id. at 294. 
233. See id. ("Judicial evaluation of academic decisions requires deference and they are 
overturned only if they are 'such a substantial departure from accepted academic nonns as to 
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional 
judgment."). 
234. Finkin, supra note 13, at 829; see also Sylvia Hurtado & Christine Navia, Reconciling 
College Access and the Affirmative Action Debate, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TEsTAMENT OF HOPE: 
STRATEGIF.S FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 105, 1 10 (Mildred Garcia ed., 1997). Hurtado 
and Navia argue that the achievement of a diverse learning environment is also a goal of educational 
institutions. See id. 
These forms of preferences in admissions practices, including the preference for racial 
diversity, can withstand legal challenges because they are intended to serve an educational 
purpose. Today, a m ajor educational goal of many institutions is to create a multicultural 
environment for student learning. To achieve that goal, these institutions must both attract 
and maintain a diverse student body. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
235. Professor Finkin also is very critical of the application of the academic freedom doctrine 
to insulate a university's admissions decisions from constitutional scrutiny. He asserts that in the 
absence of a nexus between a university's exercise of its administrative responsibilities and the 
educational goals ofinstruction, research, inquiry, or publication, the application of academic freedom 
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by the absence of quantitative empirical research evaluating the impact 
of student body diversity within the classroom, especially as it pertains 
to race and ethnicity. 236 In the absence of such quantitative data, 
qualitative reflections on this issue serve as the only source of data. In 
this regard, the remaining portion of this section examines narratives that 
describe the impact of diversity on these traditional goals. The law 
school environment serves as  our laboratory.237 
1 .  Teaching: Selection of  Course Materials 
The first area of inquiry focuses on ways in which student diversity 
influences the preparation and selection of course materials. As a 
threshold matter, faculty members now have a great selection of 
textbooks that include issues pertaining to race, class, sexual orientation, 
as a barrier to judicial scrutiny is misplaced. See Finkin, supra note 13, at 849. Finkin concedes, 
however, that there are circumstances in which admissions decisions and traditional educational goals 
are closely related: 
So, too, some admissions decisions may be closely tied to the institution's teaching and 
research goals. The admissions decisions of a graduate department in a particular 
discipline, for example, are an inextricable part of the faculty's teaching and research 
goals when graduate students also function as research or teaching assistants. A plea for 
autonomy in admissions decisions in this context would also draw support from the claim 
of academic freedom. 
Id at 849. 
Finkin further argues that Justice Powell in Bakke failed to undertake an "exacting examination" 
of whether such a nexus existed before engaging in the "relatively simple act of labeling" the . 
University's preferential admissions policies as a protected exercise of"institutional autonomy." Id. 
at 849-50. 
236. There are several studies evaluating gender in the classroom. See generally LANI GUINIER 
ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITIJTIONAL. CHANGE (1997); 
lOUISE HARMON & DEBORAH W. POST, CULTIVATING INTELLIGENCE: POWER, LAW, AND IBE 
POLITICS OF TEACHING (1996); LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, WOMEN 
IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A COMPARISON OF THE LAW SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND LAW SCHOOL 
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN ( 1 996); Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 
14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527 (1990); Marsha Garrison et al., Succeeding in Law School: A Comparison of 
Women 's Experiences at Brooklyn Law School and the University of Pennsylvania, 3 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 515 (1996); Mertz et al., supra note 18, at I. 
237. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching and Learning Toward Transformation: The Role of 
the Classroom in Noticing Privilege, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE 
UNDERMINES AMERICA 161, 167 (Stephanie M. Wildman ct al. eds., 1 996). Wildman argues that 
[t]he struggle talcing place in the academy to make gender, race, and sexual orientation 
Id. 
a part of the law school curriculum is part of this difficult struggle toward inclusive 
community. This movement has been fueled primarily by students and a number of law 
professors, many of whom are members of the Society of American Law Teachers. These 
members of the legal academy recognize the relevance and importance of issues relating 
to race, gender, and sexual orientation, not only to our lives but also to our teaching and 
learning. 
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disability, and gender from which to choose. 231 The choice of textbook 
can thereafter detennine the extent that traditional monocultural 
pedagogy239 or d iversity discourse-which seeks to incorporate the 
h istory, ideas, and experiences of minorities into the curriculum-will 
shape class discussions. In addition, even in the absence of such 
textbooks, faculty members are selecting reading materials that reflect 
their rejection of m onocultural curricula. 2•0 Selection of course materials 
that reflect an interest in diversity is not, however, without its difficulty. 
For instance, Professor Lisa C. Ikemoto identifies several costs associated 
with compiling diverse course materials, including loss of time to focus 
on "writing articles that would get more credit at promotion and tenure 
238. Recent text book publications include KATHARINE T. BARTI..ETI & ANGELA P. HARRIS, 
GENDER AND LAW: THEoRY, DocTiuNE, COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1998); MARY BECKER ET AL., 
FEMlNIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (1994); LESLIE BENDER & DAAN 
BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER (1995); CURTIS J. BERGER & 
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE (4th ed. 1997); JULIE A. NICE & LoUISE 
G. TRUBEK, POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE ( 1997); JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: 
RULES , POLICES, AND PRACTICES (2d ed.1997); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTJTIJTIONAL LAW 
(3d ed. 1996); D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW (1 998). 
239. Sonia Nieto notes that a monocultural curriculum gives students "only one way of seeing 
the world. Reality is often presented in schools as static, finished, and flat. The underlying tensions, 
controversies, passions, and problems faced by people throughout history and today are sadly 
missing." SONIA NIETO, AFFIRMING DIVERSITY 3 1 9  (2d ed. 1 996); see also Linda S .  Marchesani 
& Maurianne Adams, Dynamics of Diversity in the Teaching-Learning Process: A Faculty 
Development Model for Analysis and Action, New Directions for Teaching and Learning, No. 52 
(Maurianne Adams ed., 1992), Marchesani and Adams argue: 
Furthennore, the monocultural experiences of faculty from dominant groups socialized 
within mainstream culture often create a context in which attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors 
are not acknowledged as reflections of a particular racial group (white), ethnic heritage 
(European), or gender orientation (male) but are thought of as universal human traits. The 
tendency of individuals from dominant cultural groups to see their nonns and traditions 
as universally valued and preferred supports a cultural embededness that makes it 
extremely difficult to acknowledge the extent of negative assumptions and stereotypes 
toward those with the culture-specific beliefs we grew up with, we are surely responsible 
for examining and questioning them as adults and as educators. 
Id. at 14 (citations omitted). 
240. In discussing his use of two civil rights text books, ROY BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS 
LITIGATION: CASES ANO PERSPECTIVES (1995), and BENDER & BRAVEMAN, supra note 238, 
Professor John 0. Calmore notes that 
[p]rior to this casebook's publication . . .  I had to rely on developing my own materials, 
which lacked the advantage of good editing (they were too long), notes and problems, 
and, I admit, a basic coherence. In many ways the publication of this book and my 
supplemental text legitimated my materials and approach, somewhat rebutting the notion 
that my teaching approach and coverage of the course were so far 'out there' as to be 
kooky. 
John 0. Calmore, Close Encounters of the Racial Kind: Pedagogical Reflections and Seminar 
Conversations, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 903, 91 1 (1997) 
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time,"241 loss of political capital defending an "alternative perspective" 
that "may be perceived as threatening to the authority of others, as well 
as to the authority of majority viewpoints,"242 and loss of emotional 
energy. She writes: 
I often put together my own course materials. Obviously, this takes a great deal 
of time. It takes more time to compile readings that expressly address race, 
gender, sexual orientation, and class than it does to compile readings that 
express the "law-is-neutral" approach. There arc few published texts to use as 
models . . . .  [Y]ou have to do extra research to identify and locate readings that 
accomplish those teaching goals. I say "extra research" because contextualizing 
the course subject in a way that makes the social categories obvious often means 
taking an interdisciplinary approach. As a practical matter, that means 
c ramming in a bit of history, sociological method, science, and other areas . . .  
. But the fact that it takes so much additional effort to add context and use an 
interdisciplinary approach indicates how pervasive and deeply ingrained 
acontextual, separatist analysis is at law.20 
2. Teaching: Implementation of Diverse Pedagogical Methods 
It is important to understand that incorporating diversity into 
monocultural curricula does not stop with the selection of diverse course 
materials. 244 This second area of inquiry focuses on ways in which 
diversity influences pedagogical methods in the classroom. Both faculty 
and students must acknowledge the variety of social, political, and 
cultural experiences that are at work, and must attempt to foster an 
environment that is safe and comfortable for the expression of viewpoints 
without recrimination.245 Several common themes have been advanced 
24 1 .  Lisa Chiyemi Ikemoto, Some Tips on How to Endanger the White Male Privilege in Law 
Teaching, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 79, 82 (1997). 
242. Id. at 83. 
243. Id. at 82. 
244. See Mildred Garcia, Conclusions: Strategies for a New Era, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S 
TusTAMENT OF HOPE: STRATEGIFS FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 250 (Mildred Garcia ed., 
1997). Garcfa argues: 
Increased diversity in our classrooms brings academic vitality through the presence of 
different perspectives, different views, different languages, and different cultures. In these 
venues, questions are appropriately raised by those whose experiences and perspectives 
might be different from what has been presented in the past These differing viewpoints 
can lead to rethinking old knowledge and generating new knowledge. Most important, 
diversity requires defining and perhaps redefining "truth"-the concept at the core of 
education and discovery. 
Id. (citation omitted.) 
245. See MAURIANNE ADAMS, Pedagogical Frameworks for Social Justice Education, in 
TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A SOURCEBOOK 30, 37 (Maurianne Adams et al. 
eds., 1 997) 
Classroom safety is integrally tied to respect and the expression of emotion, especially 
emotions perceived as negative, such as fear, discomfort, threat, pain, anxiety, hostility, 
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by law faculty members who, in an effort to abandon monocultural 
discourse and curricula, have modified their pedagogical approach in 
response to either d iversity within the classroom or societal diversity.246 
For example, Professor David Dom inguez theorizes that with in  the law 
school environment, competing interests and an unequal allocation of 
resources lead to "zero-sum outcomes."247 Professor Dom inquez argues, 
however, that within this environment, traditional law school pedagogy 
can be transformed to include multicultural interests by adopting a 
"negotiable learning" teaching method .241 Th is method rel ies on 
"multicultural negotiation between small groups of students modeled after 
integrative bargaining in the commercial context."249 Other members of 
the legal academy indicate that they are more sensitive to the concerns of 
m inority students when controversial issues arise-that even in the 
absence of minority students, they expose majority students to i ssues of 
race, gender, and c lass-and that they either modify their coverage or at 
least control class discussions to acknow ledge the concerns of m inority 
students.250 This shift in pedagogical approaches is clearly in its infancy. 
and anger. 
"Students must feel secure that their comments will be treated with respect whether or 
not the faculty member or the class agrees with them. Students must have confidence 
that faculty members are in control of the discussion and will intervene, if necessary, 
to prevent personal expressions from provoking personal attacks by some who may find 
them offensive. At the same time, the faculty members must balance the need for 
creating a safe space with their obligation to see to it that blatantly false bel iefs are 
subjected to mature and thoughtful criticism. Striking the correct balance is no easy 
task." 
Id. (citation omitted)). 
246. See Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8 LA 
RAzA L.J. 140, 140 (1995). Calleros argues that 
Id. 
[t]he legal profession and legal education, once nearly exclusively the province of white 
males, has not remained unaffected by these (demographic] changes. Diversifying the 
student body has done more than create academic and professional opportunities for 
formerly excluded segments of our population. It has also introduced new challenges in 
teaching students with profoundly different experiences. 
247. David Dominguez, Beyond Zero-Sum Games: Multiculturalism as Enriched Law Training 
for All Students, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 175, 175 (1994). 
248. Id. at 178. 
249. Id. at 177-78 (discussing "integrative bargaining in the commercial context-Le., exchanges 
of goods or services which take optimal advantage of the parties' shared interests and, as well, trade 
efficiently on the parties' differences. 
250. See generally Calmore, supra note 240, at 903 ; OkianerChristian Dark, Incorporating Issues 
of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32 
WILLAMEITE L. REV. 541 (1996); Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis " to Teach 
Problem-Solving, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 65 (1997); Reginald Leamon Robinson, Teaching From the 
Margins: Race as a Pedagogical Sub-Te::ct, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 5 1  (1997); Donna E. Young, 
Two Sreps Removed: The Paradox of Diversity Discourse/or Women of Color in Law Teaching, 1 1  
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Recognizing the value of minority student voices when incorporating 
diversity issues into traditional pedagogy cannot be overemphasized. 25 1 
As a threshold matter, within traditional monocultural classroom environ­
ments both women and m inority students have expressed feelings of 
isolation which lead to decreased classroom participation and silencing. 252 
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 270 ( 1996) . 
25 1 .  Many commentators have discussed the posilive social and pedagogical benefits that can be 
derived from classroom diversity. See, for example, Tanya Murphy's argument that educational 
diversity serves as an enhancement of the academic environment: 
Educational diversity provides many educational, economic, and social benefits that make 
it an indispensable component of the academic environment First, diversifying the 
student body broadens the academic dialogue by adding value to the contributions made 
by those who do not fit within the "White male norm.'' Current affirmative action 
policies and doctrines unfortunately lead many to conclude that all Blacks are somehow 
less qualified or less deserving of their seat at the university than their White peers. 
Under the diversity principle, however, Blacks admitted to institutions through affirmative 
action initiatives are not viewed as "intellectually disadvantaged" per se. To the contrary, 
Justice Powell's theory of educational diversity "requires that admissions programs treat 
m i nority-race applicants as persons who have something valuable to contribute to the 
educational environment rather than as persons who need special help." This perspective 
characterizes affirmative action not as handout, but as a method for ensuring that colleges 
and universities have the elements necessary to provide their students with the most 
rewarding educational experience possible, in a manner most beneficial to society. 
Tanya Murphy, An Argument for Diversity Based Affirmative Action in Higher Education, 95 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 5 1 5, 541-42 (1995); see also, e.g. , Leo M. Romero, View from the Chair: 
Diversity-The legally Defensible Argument, LAW SERVICES REP. (Law School Admission Council, 
Newton, Pa.), Jan./Feb. 1999 at I ,  8. ("In thinking about the value of diversity in your law school, 
consider that the variety and richness of the intellectual discourse gives diversity its real power, and 
that our schools would be the poorer without the insights and perspectives that come from students 
from different races, cultures, and backgrounds.''); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND 
WHITE 1 37 ( 1992). Edley argues: 
In many settings, inclusion means opportunity and the richness of integration. And in 
some institutions, especially public and elite ones, visible inclusion also has powerful 
symbolic value, both political and social. It communicates an openness about the power 
structure, it commands legitimacy, and it leads traditionally excluded groups to believe, 
correctly, that the exclusion has softened or perhaps dissolved. 
EDLEY, supra, at 137. 
252. See Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class 
Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147, 148-49 (1988). 
All teaching, if it is worth anything, involves transmitting values: students learn from 
professors and professors learn from students. The transmission is rarely an equal 
interchange, however, because students look to the professor as the classroom authority 
on all issues, including the value of class contributions. Professors may use this authority, 
both consciously and unconsciously, to silence points of view and class participation or 
to encourage participation. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
The psychological impact of the devaluation of students, particularly African American women, 
was demonstrated by Professor Patricia J. Williams in THE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 5 5  
(1991 ): 
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One possible explanation for alienation and the resulting s i lence is the 
women's and m inority students' lack of ownership or investment in the 
course material.2s3 Traditional monocultural curriculum does not include 
the cultural and historic events that serve as the building blocks for the 
ideas and experiences of minority students.2s4 This inabi lity to create a 
My abiding recollection of being a student at Harvard Law School is the sense of being 
invisible . . . .  I observed large, mostly male bodies assert themselves against one another 
like football players caught in the gauzy mist of intellectual slow motion. I stood my 
ground amid them, watching them deflect from me, unconsciously, politely, as i f l  were 
a pillar in a crowded corridor. Law school was for me l ike being on another planet, full 
of alienated creatures with whom I could make little connection. The school created a 
dense atmosphere that muted my voice to inaudibility. All I could do to communicate my 
existence was to posit carefully worded messages into hermetically sealed, vacuum-packed 
blue books, place them on the waves of that foreign sea, and pray that they would be 
plucked up by some curious seeker and understood. 
Id. at SS; see also Banks, supra note 236, at 537 ("[T]he law school classroom is still structured to 
meet the needs of white upper-middle class males. The result is alienated students whose 
performance may be adversely affected."); Charles R. Lawrence Ill, Foreword: Race, 
Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 41 STAN. L. REV. 8 1 9, 84 1 (1995). 
Lawrence states: 
I have tried to make the classes ethnically diverse. It is important that many different 
ethnic communities are represented, and it is also important that, where possible, a critical 
mass of students appears from each ethnic group. This class must be a place where 
students who find themselves marginalized and alienated within white institutions can 
experience some of the safety and nurturance of homeplace. It must be a place where 
students are confident that there is enough common cause, enough trust, enough good 
will, enough shared experience and understanding to enable them to confront the most 
difficult conflicts within and between our communities and to address the hardest issues 
of ideology and strategy. 
Lawrence, supra, at 841 .  
253. But see Dark, supra note 250, at 572. Dark argues that 
Id. 
[s)ome teachers fear silence, especially when it follows the introduction of an issue about 
affirmative action or the creation of a tort for racial insults. Silence, however, is a 
wonderful teaching tool, especially in moments of awkwardness and uneasiness. Silence 
can help students focus on the underlying assumptions that he or she may be making 
regarding the efficacy of atfmnative action. Sometimes I expect or build in silence at 
certain points in the discussion that can be used for further reflection. I tell the students 
what the silent period is for and do not permit anyone to speak before everyone has had 
a chance to think more carefully about his or her point of entry into the discussion. 
Awkward silence can be a useful reminder to students that there are many reasons why 
discussion of these issues is uncomfortable and difficult for them. Likewise, they may 
experience this same awkward silence in court, at a negotiation, or with a client when 
they feel it is appropriate to raise an issue concerning diversity on behalf of the client. 
They must learn not to fear it, but to use it. 
254. See Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider 's Guide, 1 5  VT. L. REV. 
139, 139 (1990) ("Make no mistake about it. The legal system was designed by white men for white 
men. The legal system is at once a stunning portrait of white male Christian consciousness, and a 
reliable institutional protection of the consciousness."). 
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nexus between the course material and their own personal experiences 
contributes to the silencing of not only minority students, but women as 
well.255 Incorporating diversity issues into traditional curricula attempts 
to alleviate this problem by making student voices an essential component 
of the diversified pedagogical paradigm.256 The techniques advocated by 
The systematic silencing of student "voices" and ideas is not unique to the law school environment. 
bell hooks writes that a multicultural educational experience cannot be attained in the absence of 
these voices. See BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS 39-40 ( 1 994). Her reflections on her 
teaching career illustrate this point: 
Id. 
I have taught brilliant students of color, many of them seniors, who have skillfully 
managed never to speak in classroom settings. Some express the feeling that they are less 
likely to suffer any kind of assault if they simply do not assert their subjectivity. They 
have told me that many professors never showed any interest in hearing their voices. 
Accepting the decentering of the West globally, embracing multiculturalism, compels 
educators to focus attention on the issue of voice. Who speaks? Who listens? And why? 
Caring about whether all students fulfill their responsibility to contribute to learning in the 
classroom is not a common approach in what [Paulo] Freire has called the "banking 
system of education" where students are regarded merely as passive consumers. Since so 
many professors teach from that standpoint, it is difficult to create the kind of learning 
community that can fully embrace multiculturalism. Students are much more willing to 
surrender their dependency on the banking system of education than are their teachers. 
They are also much more willing to face the challenge of multiculturalism. 
255. See GUINJER ET AL., supra note 236, at 59. This groundbreaking study of gender attitudes 
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School between 1987 and 1 992 explores the role gender plays 
in the law school environment. 
From the reactions of their professors and the responses to their performance in all areas 
o f  the institution, some female students learn that they cannot thrive well in the law 
school environment. For example, the perception is widespread that within the classroom, 
white men are encouraged and allowed to speak more often than women of all colors and 
men of color, for longer periods of time, and with greater positive feedback from 
professors and peers. When women fail to receive the same level of positive response 
from faculty, many experience a blow to their self-esteem. Our data suggest that some 
women internalize the absence of positive feedback, even when the professor's aloofness 
reaches across gender lines, and some come to believe that they have little to contribute, 
becoming further alienated from the law school and the process of legal education. 
Others refuse to engage in discussion and opt for a strong stance of silence because they 
find the law school's adversarial nature, its focus on argumentation, and its emphasis on 
abstract as opposed to contextual reasoning to be unappealing. Their method of resistance 
may be to disengage. Even if this is the case, our data suggest there may be an academic 
price for such a stance. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
256. See DoNNA M. GoLLNICK & PHILIP C. CHIN, MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION IN A 
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 306-07 (5th ed. 1 998). 
Teaching that is multicultural seeks, listens to, and incorporates the student voice. 
Students are encouraged to speak from their own experiences, to do more than regurgitate 
answers that we would like to hear. Teaching that incorporates the student voice allows 
students to make sense of the subject matter within their own realities. Listening to 
student voices helps us know students' prior knowledge of the subject matter, including 
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Professor Charles R. Calleros for modifying traditional monocultural 
pedagogy directly address this issue. 2'7 Professor Calleros suggests 
several techniques, including referring to "diverse populations in course 
materials, lectures, hypothetical questions, and written problems."2$8 He 
argues that 
[t]o coax a full range of perspectives from students on provocative issues, 
instructors must lead discussions with sensitivity and open minds. Instructors 
will encourage participation from marginalized students by providing materials, 
topics, and assignments addressing issues of diversity. Beyond that, faculty 
need to set an example for the class by admitting limitations of their own 
knowledge and by acknowledging the value of listening to and considering 
diverse perspectives, even if initial reaction is to strongly disagree with them. zs9 
In addition to using "female pronouns and ethnic names," Professor 
Calleros suggests that faculty members develop "a problem, i l lustration, 
or hypothetical example in a cultural setting outside of the nonnally 
dominant mainstream. "260 Efforts such as these to include student voice 
in classroom discourse are essential to the integration of diversity issues 
within traditional monocultural pedagogy.26 1 
any misinfonnation or lack of infonnation that should suggest future instructional 
strategies. Student voices help us learn important information about students' cultures. 
Teaching must start from students' life experiences, not the teacher's life experiences or 
the experiences necessary to fit into the dominant school culture. 
Id. at 306-07. 
257. See Calleros, supra note 246, at 140. 
258. Id. at 1 50. 
259. Id. at 159. 
260. Id. at 150. 
26 1 .  A cautionary note regarding the incorporation of diversity discourse into the classroom 
concerns the risk of relying on minority students to represent the "voice" of their communities. A 
recent law school graduate wrote of her experiences in law school from the perspective of race and 
gender differences: 
There are countless stories of people of color being singled out to speak authoritatively 
about The Racial Monolith. Sometimes it is a Professor/student asking people of color 
explicitly to present the racial view; other times it is the fact of being the only whatever 
in the class, and having Professors or students look to you for approval. When we discuss 
racial issues, my face gets hot and queasy, afraid of the comments that my colleagues 
might make and feeling indignant that I must be the educator, always explaining 
my/ourselves. 
Rita Sethi, Speaking Up! Speaking Out! The Power of Student Speech in Law School Classrooms, 
16 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 6 1 ,  63 (1994); see also bell hooks, supra note 254, at 43-44. bell hooks 
argues: 
· 
Transfonning these [predominately white classrooms] is as great a challenge as learning 
how to teach well in the setting of diversity. Often, if there is one lone person of color 
in the classroom she or he is objectified by others and forced to assume the role of"native 
informant." . . .  This places an unfair responsibility onto that student Professors can 
intervene in this process by making it clear from the outset that experience does not make 
one an expert, and perhaps even by explaining what it means to place someone in the role 
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In establishing a paradigm for introducing diversity into the curriculum, 
Professor Beverly Horsburgh has correctly pointed out that "[m]erely 
slipping a case into the traditional discipline in which a plaintiff is a 
member of a minority does not eliminate prejudice or broaden a course's 
scope of vision, let alone transfonn legal education. It can even lead to 
a backlash."262 To illustrate her point, Professor Horsburgh recounts an 
attempt to introduce diversity into her course: 
In response to the traditional "Who Sued Whom?" a student told me, "A 
colored guy petitioned for custody of a child." I hope I handled the situation 
properly when I suggested the appropriate form of address was African 
American or black. The student began again and reiterated "This colored guy . 
. . . " I again asked that she use different words. The entire class fell into an 
uncomfortable silence. No one gasped or indicated by words or gesture any 
disapproval of the student's reading of the case. Student solidarity against the 
professor as prosecutor or persecutor was in the air. The small number of black 
students in the class put their heads down and became engrossed in their notes. 
The student started over and this time with great animosity repeated "A colored 
guy . . . .  " I interrupted for a third time. At this point I stopped trying to 
discuss the case and did the unthinkable. I lectured on sensitivity and insisted 
on politically correct speech.263 
The pedagogical impact of diversity is not limited to lessons on politi­
cally correct speech. As Professor Horsburgh' s  experience illustrates, 
however, the choice of words used in the classroom by students and 
faculty can serve as one of the biggest obstacles to an attempt to create 
a comfortable environment for raising issues of race, gender, class, 
disability, or sexual orientation. 
The diversification of traditional pedagogy through the incorporation 
of m inority voices into the monocultural classroom enhances the 
classroom experience of both students and faculty members.264 Although 
of "native infonnant" It must be stated that professors cannot intervene if they also see 
students as "native infonnants." 
bell hooks, supra note 254, at 43-44. 
262. Beverly Horsburgh, Decent and Indecent Proposals in the law: Reflections on Opening the 
Contracts Discourse to Include Outsiders, 1 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 57, 60 (1994). Professor 
Horsburgh further notes that 
[o]pening course diversity is more than a numbers game. The outsider's point of view 
should also be included to instill sensitivity. Because there are multiple disparate minority 
voices as well as many disagreements on approaches and solutions to outsider problems, 
any attempt to meaningfully attain diversity can become entangled in a contradictory 
jurisprudence. 
Id. at 60-61 
263. Id. at 57-58. 
264. Unquestionably, traditional legal pedagogy is pedagogy created by the dominant culture for 
the dominant culture. Although one could argue that the law school environment has its own unique 
pedagogical paradigm, its traditional methods of instruction share common attributes with the 
"banking" system of education described by human rights activist Paulo Freire. Freire sees 
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the assumption that all minority students will share identical viewpoints 
and ideas is clearly erroneous, it is not, however, implausible, given the 
current political, economic, and social conditions faced by minority 
students, to acknowledge that minority students can offer perspectives that 
differ from their white counterparts.265 For example, discussing the 
oppression in any educational system of the banking of infonnation where "education thus becomes 
an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. 
Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students 
patiently receive, memorize, and repeat." PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF rnE OPPRESSED 53 (Myra 
Bergman Rames trans., rev. ed. 1993). 
bell hooks advocates for "engaged pedagogy," which "emphasizes well-being." hooks, supra note 
254, at 21. That means that "teachers must be actively committed to a process of self-actualization 
that promotes their own well-being if they are to teach in a manner that empowers students. The 
empowerment of students, she writes, fosters an educational environment that "does not reflect biases 
or reinforce systems of domination," but instead students and teachers "are empowered by the 
process." Id. The inspiration for hooks's views is Paulo Freire. hooks states: 
When I first began college, Freire's thought gave me the support I needed to challenge 
the "banking system" of education, that approach to learning that is rooted in the notion 
that all students need to do is consume infom1ation fed to them by a professor and be able 
to memorize and store it. Early on, it was Freire's insistence that education could be the 
practice of freedom that encouraged me to create strategies for what he called 
"conscientization" in the classroom. Translating that term to critical awareness and 
engagement, I entered the classrooms with the conviction that it was crucial for me and 
every other student to be an active participant, not a passive consumer. Education as the 
practice of freedom w as  continually undermined by professors who were actively hostile 
to the notion of student participation. Freire's work affirmed that education can only be 
liberatory when everyone claims knowledge as a field in which we all labor. 
Id. at 14. 
265. Racial minority group membership does lead to shared experiences which may influence 
group members in ways that are definitely different from influences on members of the majority 
group. It is these different, shared experiences that diversity seeks to incorporate. See Murphy, 
supra note 251, at 542. Murphy argues: 
Importantly, the variety of viewpoints that the university seeks to foster does not come 
from any innate difference between the races themselves, but rather from the varying life 
experiences of the individuals, due in large part to their racial backgrounds. As 
University of California at Berkeley President Chang-Lin Tien suggests, "People of 
diverse backgrounds tend to shape different questions and apply different methods to find 
the answers." New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis adds, "In the lives of 
Americans, race is a profound factor. Blacks may be bright or dull, rich or poor, but their 
experience in life has been different from whites." This view of diversity provides a 
forceful argument against claims that race is an inappropriate proxy for "racial 
characteristics." 
Id; see also Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 855, 
862 (1 995). Brest and Oshige argue: 
The importance of a diverse student body and faculty does not depend on the false notion 
that one's race or ethnicity defines a particular way of thinking about issues of law and 
policy. It does assume the reality-no less a reality because it is socially constructed­
that people of different races and ethnicities often have different life experiences that 
affect their relations with members of other groups and influence their views on issues 
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jurisprudential attributes of a "Terry Stop"266 with a room full of white 
students may not yield a thorough analysis of the relevant socio-political 
and racial issues underlying the case. The depth of class discussion will 
take on greater significance, however, if minority students are present and 
willing to discuss either their first-hand experience of "driving while 
black,"267 or the impact that being a member of a profiled group has on 
their lives and conduct. 268 
The case of Evans v. Abney, 269 which is standard reading in first year 
Property, further illustrates this point.270 Evans involved an equal 
of legal doctrine and policy. 
Brest & Oshige, supra, at 862. 
266. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ( 1 968). Terry is a watershed decision in which the Supreme 
Court upheld a law enforcement technique commonly refem:d to as "stop and frisk" in circumstances 
in which the law enforcement officer has only a minimal level of suspicion of criminal activity. See 
id. 
267. The tenn "DWB," or "Driving While Black," describes law enforcement's use of racial 
profiles to detain African Americans for pretextual traffic violations. See generally Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 2 1 4  ( 1983); Jennifer A. Larrabee, 
DWB (Driving While Black) and Equal Protection, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 291 ( 1997); Michael A. Fletcher, 
Driven to Extremes: Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police Stops, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at 
Al;  Paul W. Valentine, Maryland Settles Lawsuit over Racial Profiles: Police Allegedly Targeted 
Minorities for Searches, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at Bl .  
268. See Rudenstine, supra note 38, at 1 1 . According to Rudenstine, 
Id. 
[d]iscussion and debate are not purely intellectual processes. They involve emotion and 
conviction as well as reason and argument. They convert "passion into resolution," and 
teach candor and moral courage. Education and learning arc in this sense human and 
moral processes concerned ultimately with values and effective action. They are most 
fully tested when individuals engage others whose ideas, passions, experiences, and beliefs 
differ from their own. 
269. 396 U.S. 435 (1970). 
270. Another example of the barriers to diversity discourse that can be created by language was 
conveyed to me by a white professor who was covering intentional infliction of emotional distress 
in a first year Torts class. Her class included a smal  number of African American students. She 
sought my advice, as one of two .African American faculty members, regarding the best way to 
approach the use of the word "nigger" in her class. This issue arose as a result of her coverage of 
Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970), in  which an African American truck 
driver filed an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his employer for the 
verbal abuse he suffered at the hands of his white supervisor. The specific verbal abuse related to 
a shouting incident in which the following phrase was expressed: "You goddamn 'niggers' are not 
going to tell me about the rules. I don't want any 'niggers' working for me. I am getting rid of all 
of the 'niggers,'; go pick up and deliver that 8-ton roller to the other job site and get your pay check; 
you're fired." Alcorn, 468 P.2d at 2 1 7 .  
The professor was concerned that her use of the word during class discussion would be offensive 
to some of her students, not only the African Americans. Additionally, she did not want her use 
of the word to be perceived as tacit approval of its use in normal parlance. We discussed several 
possible ways to address this issue, one of which included totally ignoring it. Other suggestions 
included the idea of omitting the case from her coverage of this subject, or making a disclaimer 
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protection challenge to the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court to 
tenninate a trust created pursuant to the terms of the will of United States 
Senator A.O. Bacon.27 1 Senator Bacon devised land to the City of 
Macon, Georgia for use as "a park and pleasure ground" for white people 
only. 272 After the United States Supreme C ourt detennined that continued 
operation of the park as a segregated facil ity violated the Equal Protection 
C lause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled 
that the trust should fail, nd that the corpus of the trust should revert to 
the Senator's heirs.273 The United States Supreme Court upheld 
Georgia's decision to terminate the trust.274 
During the coverage of Evans in one of my courses, a confrontation 
occurred between several students regarding the use of racially offensive 
words. During the d iscussion, a clear demarcation developed between the 
black and white students regarding whether Bacon's intent should control 
the court's decision to apply the cy pres doctrine in light of societal 
changes that occurred during the years subsequent to the creation of the 
trust. In midst of a heated class discussion regarding Senator Bacon's 
intent, a white student referred to blacks as ''Negroes" and "coloreds." 
Although these terms were used in the case, m the casual use of these 
terms during class discussions infuriated some of the students. The 
African American students looked to me either to remedy the s ituation or 
to empower them into action.276 I stopped the class and attempted to 
before the discussion began about the nature of offense associated with the word, or simply banning 
the word from the class discussion. 1.{ltimately, she used the case, but substituted for "the N word" 
or some other Jess inflammatory word for the word "nigger." 
271.  See Evans, 396 U.S. at 436. 
272. See id. at 437. 
273. See id. at 438-39. 
274. See id. at 446-47. 
275. For example, Senator Bacon's will contained a number of specific references to African 
Americans as "Negroes" or "Colored": 
I take occasion to say that in limiting the use and enjoyment of this property perpetually 
to white people, I am not influenced by any unkindness of feeling or want of consider­
ation for the Negroes, or colored people. On the contrary I have for them the kindest 
feeling, and for many of them esteem and regard, while for some of them I have sincere 
personal affection. 
Id. at 442. 
276. bell hooks discusses the difficulties inherent in incorporating diversity discourse into the 
classroom. See hooks, supra note 254, at 35-36. She explains that 
most of us were taught in classrooms where styles of teachings reflected the notion of a 
single norm of thought and experience, which we were encouraged to believe was 
universal. This has been just as true for nonwhite teachers as for white teachers. Most 
of us learned to teach emulating this model. As a consequence, many teachers are 
disturbed by the political implications of a multicultural education because they fear losing 
control in a classroom where there is no one way to approach a subject-only multiple 
ways and multiple references. 
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explain the significance and impact of those words to the class.277 
C learly, it was ignorance, not racial animosity on the part of the white 
student who set this into motion, but his ignorance did not diminish the 
rage and anger experienced by some other students, especially the African 
American students. 278 In the midst of this experience, however, barriers 
were overcome and all of the students gained a greater understanding of 
the competing social, h istoric, political, and cultural interests that 
influenced the Supreme Court's decision in Evans. Although the words 
"Negroes" and "colored" are archaic symbols of a bygone era, their usage 
in class discussion served as a barometer of the students' readiness to 
engage in diversity discourse and to incorporate diversity issues into the 
classroom without the simultaneous introduction of fear, anxiety, and 
discomfort. As a result of that experience, when I cover this case, I place 
Id. at 35-36. She further argues: 
[Faculty] unwillingness to approach teaching from a standpoint that includes awareness 
of race, sex, and class is often rooted in the fear that classrooms will be uncontrollable, 
that emotions and passions will not be contained. To some extent, we all know that 
whenever we address in the classroom subjects that students are passionate about there is 
always a possibility of confrontation, forceful expression of ideas, or even conflict In 
much of my writing about pedagogy, particularly in classroom settings with great 
diversity, I have talked about the need to examine critically the way we as teachers 
conceptualize what the space for learning should be like. Many professors have conveyed 
to me their feeling that the classroom should be a "safe" place; that usually translates to 
mean that the professor lectures to a group of quiet students who respond only when they 
are called on. The experience of professors who educate for critical consciousness 
indicates that many students, especially students of color, may not feel at all "safe" in 
what appears to be a neutral setting. It is the absence of a feeling of safety that often 
promotes prolonged silence or lack of student engagement 
Id. at 39. 
277. Lani Guinier discusses the impact that her role as an African American, female law 
professor has on empowering and inspiring her students: 
In the conventional sense of the term, I function not only as a teacher but as a symbol 
for certain student voices and aspirations. I bear witness as a trophy of achievement My 
conspicuous presence may rebut assumptions of group inferiority that undermine student 
confidence and performance. My example not only legitimizes the competence of 
matriculating minority students; my visibility helps lure future minority and female 
students into the profession. Role models provide psychological uplift, affirming the 
status of black women as law school citizens who can participate fully in the educational 
process. By confirming black an d  female advancement, black women role models may 
also be seen as living symbols of the equal opportunity process. 
LANI GUINIER ET AL., supra note 236, at 89-90. 
Id. 
278. See Rudenstine, supra note 38, at 20. Rudenstine argues: 
Real learning, in all its dimensions, rarely takes place altogether easily, without friction 
or pain. Indeed, the educational benefits of diversity are often first experienced as forms 
of temporary dislocation and disorientation-just as they can eventually lead to increased 
understanding and friendship. Genuine risks and difficulties are involved, and it would 
be foolish to pretend otherwise. 
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this case and the words used therein into a historical framework, clearly 
pointing out that although acceptable then, the utterance of such words 
now is clearly offensive and unacceptable notwithstanding the motivations 
of the speaker. 
The impact of diversity on law school pedagogy is not limited to 
courses that traditionally raise equal protection issues such as constitu­
tional law and gender discrimination.279 For example, in a family law 
course, Professor Lundy Langston has examined how societal diversity 
resulting from demographic changes in society influences pedagogical 
methods in that course. Professor Langston argues that the methodology 
used to teach fami ly law should be modified to value the diversity of 
"family lifestyle experiences" that are the product of the pluralistic nature 
of our society. 210 He argues that the absence of such pedagogical 
modifications have a "silencing or normalizing effect" if the focus of a 
family law class is based solely on traditional notions of marriage and 
family.281 To counter such effects, he offers several pedagogical 
modifications to traditional approaches to family law courses, including 
changing the course name to reflect the evolving definition of family, 
279. In addition to selection of course materials, Professor Beverly Horsburgh has offered the 
following suggestions for modifying hypothetical Contract problems to reflect an awareness of 
diversity issues: 
Hypotheticals that essentialize all individuals into the prototypical offeror or offeree 
eliminate the significance of differences and the ways in which differences have been so­
cially constructed into handicaps. If color and gender, as well as an individual's socio­
economic situation, are not recognized and brought into the contracts discourse as 
substantial barriers that interfere with the exercise of bargaining power, diversity becomes 
a masquerade. The prototypical minority offeror who is not encumbered with the social 
disadvantages of race, gender, or both, is only a male dressed in a skirt or a white don­
ning black face. Nominal inclusion approaches misled students into thinking that 
everyone faces the same transactional problems and that these problems are unrelated to 
minority status. In using this strategy to include minorities, a professor could desensitize 
students from appreciating the difference that differences make in a sexualized, colorized 
world. 
Horsburgh, supra note 262, at 66-67; see also Calleros, supra note 246, at 147 ("[A]cademic subjects 
set in multicultural contexts that raise issues of difference in our society are worthy mechanisms for 
acquiring critical thinking skills. Indeed, they may be superior vehicles for developing the ability 
to approach a problem from multiple perspectives an d  enhancing sensitivity to potential client 
relations problems."); Dark, supra note 250, at SS I ("There are many examples of how to raise or 
incorporate diversity issues in many courses like criminal law, contracts, torts, constitutional law, and 
even antitrust. The variety of courses suggests something that I believe is fundamentally true: Diver­
sity discussions can be integrated throughout the law school curriculum."). 
280. Lundy Langston, Political and Social Construction of Families Through Pedagogy in 
Family Law Classrooms, 13 DENV. U. L. REV. 179, 1 79 (1995). 
281. Id. 
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focusing on "doctrines such as equal protection, privacy, and personhood 
under the Constitution,"212 and finally 
[teaching] family law with an emphasis on multiculturalism which would 
prevent a "perspectivelessness" view and would provide an education on family 
matters according to the various cultural perspectives that make up our 
pluralistic society. Implementing a course on the law of relationships would 
allow for various lifestyles and cultural differences to be discussed in a way that 
would force the students to think about, but not value, varying structures. It 
would also encourage students, as future lawyers, to focus on serving the 
individual needs of their clients.213 
The influence of minority group members on the quality of classroom 
discourse was illustrated by the experiences of Professor Leo M. Romero 
when discussing the case of State v. Wi/liams214 in his Criminal Law 
class. 215 In Williams, an Indian couple was convicted of manslaughter for 
failing to obtain medical treatment for their dying child. 286 Professor 
Romero noted that the contribution of Native American students' voices 
to the class he taught in New Mexico enhanced the depth of discourse in 
a way that was markedly different from the class discussion of only non-
282. Id. at 199. Langston argues such modifications in family law or similar courses enable 
students to see 
the benefits of treating an interpersonal relationship as a family and the difficulties that 
abound when personal relationships are not treated as family. Intra-family and state and 
family cases such as abortion, contraceptive, right to die, parent-child relationships and 
property distribution on death, provide excellent opportunities to discuss the legal analysis 
and consequences that attend to the determination of whether individuals constitute a 
family, without using marriage as the starting or ending point in the discussion. 
Id. To further illustrate, Langston cites the anecdotal experiences of a family law professor regarding 
efforts to modify the family law course to reflect the expanded definition of family. The professor 
recounted: 
I followed the family definition discussion with an exploration of what I called "Family 
Formation via Procreation." During this segment we examined issues involved in 
contraception, abortion, sterilization, rights of the fetus and new reproductive techniques, 
such as surrogacy and alternate insemination. The result of covering this material at the 
beginning of the course that discusses marriage, divorce and custody, has been that we 
did not discuss marriage until the fourth week of the semester. By then, the students 
appeared to be accepting the notion that "family" did not require or mean marriage. 
While my experience is anecdotal at best, it certainly raised the prospect of moving the 
discussion of family further back in the course and discussing more legal doctrine that 
affects "families" rather than "marriages." 
Id. at 200 n. 156 (citation omitted). 
283. Id. at 198. 
284. State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1 1 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). 
285. See Romero, supra note 251 ,  at 8. 
286. See Williams, 484 P.2d at 1 1 74. 
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Native American students at Roger Williams University in Rhode 
Island. 287 He observed that 
[t]he participation of Native Americans enriches the learning of the other 
students who hear new concerns and perspectives. Likewise, the Indian students 
learn from non-Native American students, often parents, who approach the case 
from the perspective of protecting all children and question the assumptions and 
opinions voiced by the Indian students. Such a rich discussion, in my opinion, 
enhances the learning of all students in the c lass. They learn about differences 
in culture and values and the extent to which the law should take into account 
these differences; they also learn the importance of listening to others and of 
trying to make law just for everyone. My students at Roger Williams, 
unfortunately, did not get the benefit of this first-hand discussion.211 
3. Inquiry, Research, and Scholarship 
This final area of inquiry focuses on the impact that diversity has on 
the goals of inquiry, research, and scholarship.289 Within the legal 
academy, to continue my example, the increased presence of racial and 
ethnic minority students and faculty in the classroom has had a tremen­
dous impact on legal scholarship.290 This entry of minorities into the 
287. See Romero, supra note 25 1 , at 8. 
Id. 
This fall the discussion lacked the insights and perspectives that I had come to expect 
from my experience with Native American students in the class. Questions like whether 
the court was applying white middle class norms of behavior to the Indian defendants, 
whether the test for negligence should be modified to take into account the reasonable 
Shoshone parent and nontraditional health care, and whether such modification would 
mean a lower standard of care for Indian children are just some of the questions that are 
frequently raised in my course in New Mexico. 
288. Id. 
289. Mildred Garcia argues that a strategic emphasis for the continued "formulation and 
strengthening of affirmative action policies" should be placed on qualitative and quantitative research 
efforts that "definitively demonstrate the benefits of affirmative action policies and the educational 
value and experiences they promote." Garcia, supra note 244, at 256. The fourth component of 
Garcia's eight-point strategic plan focuses solely on research goals: 
Id. 
4. Encourage faculty members to conduct research to substantiate the value and success 
of diversity and affirmative action policies. The results of these studies need to be 
published in the popular press and should emphasize the use of strong assessment and 
evaluation components. 
290. See Murphy, supra note 251 , at 543. Murphy argues that 
[t]he diversification of the faculty and student bodies at American colleges and 
universities has already fostered a movement to rethink and reshape university curriculums 
into racially and ethnically inclusive foundations for study. Chang-Lin Tien explains: In 
legal education, the addition of women scholars opened the field of feminist jurispru· 
dence, which uses new methodologies and new perspectives in shaping answers. Another 
new area of legal scholarship is critical race theory. African-American, Hispanic, and 
Asian-American scholars arc questioning the legal treatment of racial and· ethnic groups 
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academy affords previously excluded voices the opportunity to contribute 
their own historical, cultural, and experiential perspectives to ongoing 
jurisprudential dialogues, thus shaping and influencing the development 
of our legal system in ways that are more representative of the demo­
graphic framework of our society.291 In addition, diversification of 
students and faculty fosters an atmosphere in which m inority group 
members can examine areas that are of specific interest or importance to 
them and the constituencies they represent.292 Indicative of this diversifi­
cation are the new areas of legal scholarship, such as "Critical Race 
theory, "293 feminist legal theory, 294 and "LatCrit" theory, m that developed 
and exploring the implications of this treatment on the entire system of justice. 
Id. 
29 1 .  See Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls, Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential 
Method, A Talk Presented at the Yale Law School Conference on Women of Color and the Law, 
April 16, 1988, l l WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989). Matsuda states: 
Id. 
Outsider scholars have recognized that their specific experiences and histories are relevant 
to jurisprudential inquiry. They reject narrow evidentiary concepts of relevance and 
credibility. They reject artificial bifurcation of thought and feeling. Their anger, their 
pain, their daily lives, and the histories of their people are relevant to the definition of 
justice. 
292. See Brest & Oshige, supra note 265, at 864. Brest and Oshige argue that 
[t]hese observations apply not only to students, but to the faculty in their mission of 
producing and disseminating knowledge. Skepticism about the relevance of diverse life 
experiences to a university's mission sometimes manifests itself in the observation that a 
work of scholarship must stand or fall on its own merits, without regard to the scholar's 
group affiliation. While we have no doubt that this observation is true, it fails to negate 
the equally obvious point that different life experiences affect scholars' agendas, 
viewpoints, and approaches to their subjects in ways that enhance knowledge. Especially 
in law, where regulations and judicial decisions affect different groups differently, it 
would be amazing if a scholar's experiences did not affect her outlook and interests, and 
hence her work. The presence of women and minority scholars bas in fact changed the 
intellectual landscape of some areas of law, and their influence has permeated fields that 
many would not have imagined had much connection with gender or race. In any subject 
where a faculty member's experience brings different perspectives to her scholarship, it 
will likely enhance her teaching in similar ways. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
293. See, e.g. , CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUITING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); 
CRITICAL RACE lHEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw 
et al. eds., 1 995); Raneta J. Lawson, Critical Race Theory as Praxis: A View From Outside the 
Outside, 3 8  How. L.J. 353 (1995); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and 
Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 82 1 ,  875-80 (1997). 
For a discussion of Critical Race Theory and its impact on hate speech jurisprudence, see generally, 
MARI ]. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, AsSAULTIVE SPEECH, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 ( 1 993). 
Teachers of color in the legal academy who chose to join this tradition of radical teaching 
have sought, in their teaching and scholarship, to articulate the values and modes of 
analysis that inform their vocation of struggle. These efforts have produced an emerging 
648 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
as a result of the increased number of m inorities in the legal academy. 
In addition, recent legal textbook publ ications also reflect the inclusion 
of issues pertaining to race, gender, class, disability, and sexual orienta­
tion into the classroom.296 As law schools continue to hire minority 
faculty, some of these individuals will continue to focus their research 
interests to reflect experiences and ideas originating from their own 
cultural and historic perspectives. 297 
Finally, scholarship diversification is in  direct response to the increased 
role played by the judiciary in its modem interpretation of the constitu­
tional protections and limitations afforded to all members of society. As 
long as legal challenges to the use of race-based admissions criteria 
remain at the forefront of American jurisprudence, inquiry and research 
in this area of constitutional interpretation will continue to flourish. This 
Article is but one of dozens of articles298 and symposia299 publ ished in the 
Id. 
genre known as critical race theory. Critical race theory is grounded in the particulars of 
social reality that is defined by our experiences and the collective historical experience 
of our communities of origin. Critical race theorists embrace subjectivity of perspective 
and are avowedly political. Our work is both pragmatic and utopian, as we seek to 
respond to the immediate needs of the subordinated and oppressed even as we imagine 
a different world and offer different values. It is work that involves both action and 
reflection. It is infonncd by active struggle and in tum informs that struggle. 
294. See generally FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Patricia Smith ed., 1993); FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993); Pamela D. Bridgewater, Connectedness and 
Closeted Questions: Tire Use of Hutory in Developing Feminut Legal Theory, 1 1  WIS. WOMEN'S 
L.J. 35 1 (1997); Vicki Quade, Redefining Notions: Feminist Legal Theory Pushes into the 
Mainstream, 20 HUM. RTS. 8 (1993); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 617 (1990). 
295. See generally Franciso Valdes, Under Construction: LatCritConsciousness, Community, and 
Theory, 10 LA RAzA L.J. 3 (1998). 
296. See supra note 238. 
297. See generally, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 252; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography 
and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539 
( 1991); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black legal Scholarship: Race and Original 
Understandings, 1 99 1  DUKE L.J. 39; Okianer Christian Dark, Just My 'Magination, 10 HARV. 
BLACKLEITER J. 2 1  ( 1 993); Angela Mae Kupenda, Making Traditional Courses More Inclusive: 
Confessions of an African American Female Professor Who Attempted to Crash All the Barriers at 
Once, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 975 (1997); Robinson, supra note 250; Jennifer M. Russell, On Being A 
Gorilla in Your Midst, or, The Life of One Blackwoman in the legal Academy, 28 HARV. C. R.-C.L. 
L. REv. 259 (1993); Young, supra note 250. 
298. See generally Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity 
Justification, 29 TEx. TECH L. REV. I (1998); Brest & Oshige, supra note 265. Richard Delgado, 
Five Months later (The Trial Court Opinion}, 71 TEx. L. REV. 101 1 (1993); Daniel A. Farber, The 
Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 893 (1994); Lino A. Graglia, 
Podbcresky, Hopwood, and Adarand: Implications for the Future of Race Based Programs, 16 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 287 ( 1 996); Murphy, supra note 25 1 .  
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last fifteen years in furtherance of diversity issues such as affinnative 
action, civil rights, and discrimination-all of which were either in 
response to, or an attempt to, influence judicial decision-making. Clearly, 
the impact on the research and publication functions of universities has 
been, and will continue to be, influenced by the presence of diversity not 
only within the academy, but within society as a whole. 
The educational community is not an isolated environment. On the 
contrary, it is an amalgamation of diverse people, issues, interests and 
concerns. The admissions decision-making process used to assemble the 
members of this amalgam must reflect this diversity.300 Within the legal 
academy, legal scholarship, as well as the content and methods of 
classroom instruction, are being modified to reflect, either directly or 
indirectly, the academy's response to the presence of racial minorities 
within this environment. 301 The successful integration of racial and ethnic 
299. See Symposium, Race Relations in America, 27 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 287 (1997); 
Symposium, Critical Race Perspectives for the New Millennium-Second Annual Northeastern People 
of Color Legal Scholarship Conference, 3 1  NEW ENG. L. REV. 705 ( 1 997); Symposium, Race-Based 
Remedies, 84 CAL. L. REV. 875 ( 1 996); Symposium, Polilical Correctness in the J 990s and Beyond, 
23 N. KY. L. REV. 471 (1996); Symposium, The Role of Affirmalive Aclion in lhe 1990s, 23 S. U. 
L. REV. I 07 (1996); Symposium, Affirmalive Action and lhe California Civil Righls Initiative, 27 U. 
WEST L. A. L. REV. 26S (1996); Symposium, Race and &medy in a Mullicullural Society, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 855 ( 1 995); Symposium, Post-Croson, 383 URB. LAW. 381 ( 1 994); Symposium, Race 
Consciousness and Legal Scholarship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 945 ( 1992); Symposium, The FulUre 
of Affirmalive Aclion, 44 ARK. L. REv. 9 1 5  ( 1991); Symposium, Diversily and the Law, 1 7  WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 393 (1991); Symposium, A.ff/1'1'1Qtive Action, 2 1  GA. L. REV. 1007 (1987); 
Symposium, Affirmative Action, 12 IOWA L. REV. 2S5 (1987); Symposium, Minorily Legal 
Pedagogy: Foundation for Parlicipation in lhe Legal Profession, 1 2  T. MARsHALL L. REV. 299 
(1987). 
300. See Hurtado &. Navia, supra note 234, at 127. Hurtado and Navia made the following 
recommendation: 
Id. 
In addition, higher education institutions and their admissions offices should assess the 
extent to which they have relied upon affirmative action as the primary means for 
diversifying their campuses and student bodies. The use of racial preferences in college 
admissions is a legal way to ensure diversity, but more documentation may be necessary 
in terms of providing information on historical and continuous barriers that women and 
different racial/ethnic groups face in gaining admission. Admissions officers at selective 
colleges must also acknowledge the biases that result from employing specific criteria for 
different groups and address them by considering a wide range of infonnation on each 
candidate, and then selecting students who excel along several dimensions. Moreover, as 
with all other types of preferences in admissions, institutions must be able to articulate 
how their selection practices are consistent with the institution's mission and goals. The 
goal of educating a diverse student body is not only important to educational processes 
within the institution, but also extends beyond the campus community to the larger social 
goals of decreasing inequality, improving race relations, and increasing economic 
productivity and civic participation among broad segments of society. 
30 1 .  See Finkin, supra note 13, at 846. 
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minorities within the academy will continue to necessitate changes in 
historically accepted pedagogical approaches. As a result, diversification 
of the American classroom has becom e  an academic exercise aimed at 
fostering the "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation"' 
that Justice Powell  sought in Baklce.302 
IV. LIMITS ON TIIE EXERCISE OF INSTI11JTIONAL AUTONOMY 
As defined in Part III, the exercise o f  institutional autonomy is only 
protected by the First Amendment when an educational institution is 
engaged in academic decision-making. More specifically, in the absence 
of evidence of past discrimination, only academic decisions undertaken 
with the goal of attaining a diverse student body may serve as constitu­
tional justification for the use .of race-based classifications. Although 
this doctrine is limited in scope by its applicability only to academic 
decisions, the opportunity for abuse exists. 
For example, universities may use the protections afforded by the First 
Amendment to restructure the admissions decision-making process to 
exclude disfavored racial and ethnic minorities, particular gender groups, 
or individuals with unpopular social or pol itical ideologies. To avoid this 
result, additional l imitations are necessary.303 In Bakke, Justice Powell 
cautioned that the recognition of institutional autonomy to foster diversity 
within the academic environment is not absolute, but must be tempered 
by "constitutional limitations protecting individual rights ."304 Part IV 
explores the question left unanswered by Justice Powell's admonition; 
that is, how far can educational institutions go in the exerci se of their 
right to select a diverse student body before infringing on the equal 
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
Further limitation of this doctrine requires adherence to a narrow 
interpretation of Justice Powell's definition of diversity. As set forth in 
302. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 3 12  (1978). 
303. See Byrne, supra note 41,  at 338. Professor Byrne suggested the following: 
Just as importantly, constitutional academic freedom ought not to protect institutions 
resembling universities but which do not pursue genuine liberal studies-that prohibit or 
consistently discourage professors from following controversial arguments, that recognize 
no role for faculty in governance, or that seek to indoctrinate rather than educate students. 
In other words, universities that do not respect the academic freedom of professors (under­
stood as the core of the doctrine developed by the AAUP) or the essential intellectual 
freedom of students (a concept barely developed) ought not to be afforded institutional 
autonomy. This limitation, dictated by the justification for the right, may lessen fears that 
institutional freedom will cloak extensive violations of professors' academic freedom by 
institutions bent on intellectual orthodoxy. Institutions so perverse in their ends will 
suffer the loss of constitutional status, a risk that may deter abuses. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
304. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 14. 
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Bakke, diversity was defined not simply in terms of racial or ethnic 
diversity, but as Justice Powell explained, "diversity that furthers a 
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications 
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element."305 In addition to requiring the individualized 
evaluation of every applicant, an educational institution must consider 
factors "likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism."306 Although 
the concept of diversity is based, in large part, on a case-by-case 
determination, Justice Powell offered guidance in defining the parameters 
necessary to achieve "educational pluralism."307 In their efforts to attain 
a diversified student body, educational institutions are not restricted to 
considering only "students from disadvantaged economic, racial and 
ethnic groups," but may also consider such factors as a student' s  
geographic background and social and academic interests.308 
Limiting the extension of institutional autonomy to admissions 
decisions that fall within the parameters of strict adherence to the letter 
and spirit of Justice Powell 's  definition of diversity will ensure that only 
educational policies conforming to this standard will benefit from First 
Amendment guarantees that insulate the exercise of institutional 
autonomy. 309 Neil Rudenstine has stated: 
The most constructive and well-conceived admissions programs are those that 
view affinnative action in relation to the educational benefits of diversity. They 
may take various characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or gender into account 
as potential "plus" factors (among many others) when evaluating candidates, but 
they do not assign such characteristics an overriding value. Nor do they aim to 
achieve specific numerical targets, either through the use of set-asides or quotas. 
They involve energetic efforts in outreach, but not mandated outcomes. 
Programs of this kind, when they are carefully designed and implemented, 
preserve an institution's capacity-with considerable flexibility-to make its 
own detenninations in admissions. This capacity and flexibility have been 
critical in the past, and will continue to be so in the future.310 
305. Id. at 3 15. 
306. Id. at 3 1 7. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 322 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.). With respect to the attainment ofa diverse 
medical school student body, Justice Powell identified several important factors including "excep­
tional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, 
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the 
poor, or other qualifications deemed important" Id. at 317. In this regard, Justice Powell cited with 
approval the use of race and ethnicity in the admissions decision-making model used by Harvard 
College. See id. at 3 16-18. A description of the Harvard Admissions program was set forth in the 
appendix to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. See id. at 321-24. 
309. See discussion supra Part 11.B. 
3 10. Rudenstine, supra note 38, at 45. 
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Additionally, such adherence will eliminate attempts to extend 
constitutional protection to definitions of diversity that are inconsistent 
with Justice Powell 's mandate. For example, the First Circuit in 
Wessmann v. Gittens,3 1 1  assumed that the goal of attainment of diversity 
of a student body could justify the use of racial and ethnic admissions 
criteria for the purpose of withstanding an equal protection chal lenge.312 
However, after evaluating the admissions policies in light of Justice 
Powell 's definition of diversity, the Wessmann court noted that the 
school's admissions policy focused exclusively on racial and ethnic 
diversity.3 13 This pool of potential students was further restricted to "only 
five group�lacks, whites, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Ameri­
cans-without recognizing that none is monolithic."3 14 The court 
concluded that the school's selection criteria "appear[ed] to be less a 
means of attaining diversity in any constitutionally relevant sense and 
more a means for racial balancing."3 1s The resulting racial balancing, 
coupled with the policy's impermissible focus on specific group 
characteristics instead of individualized evaluations, led the First Circuit 
to conclude that the admissions policy was inconsistent with the "concept 
of diversity" as articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke.3 16 
In the event academic decision-making is engaged in for the sole 
purpose of racial exclusion, and not in accordance with the purpose of 
attaining diversity, First Amendment insulation would yield to counter­
vailing equal protection considerations. Although this analysis is 
consistent with the Supreme Court's historic rejection of racially 
3 1 1 .  160 F.3d 790 (lst Cir. 1998). 
3 12. See id. at 800. 
3 13. See id. at 798. 
314. Id. 
3 1 5. Id. The court stated: 
It cannot be said that racial balancing is either a legitimate or necessary means of 
advancing the lofty principles recited in the Policy. The closest the School Committee 
comes to linking racial balancing to these ideals is by introducing the concept of "racial 
isolation." The idea is that unless there is a certain representation of any given racial or 
ethnic group in a particular institution, members of that racial or ethnic group will find 
it difficult, if not impossible, to express themselves. Thus, the School Committee says, 
some minimum number of black and Hispanic students-precisely how many, we do not 
know-is required to prevent racial isolation. 
Id. at 799. 
316. See id. The Wessman court commented on the admissions policy as follows: 
Either way, the School Committee tells us that a minimum number of persons of a given 
race (or ethnic background) is essential to facilitate individual expression. This very 
position concedes that the Policy's raciaVethnic guidelines treat "individuals as the product 
of their race," a practice that the Court consistently has denounced as impermissible 
stereotyping. 
Id. 
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exclusive classifications, 3 1 7  consideration of racial and ethnic characteris­
tics remain an essential component of the diversity paradigm.318 A s  
Justice Powell recognized, however, the inclusive nature of diversity 
cannot be realistically achieved without the consideration of race and 
ethnicity as factors in the process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Expansion of First Amendment guarantees o f  academic freedom to 
educational institutions wil l  ensure that educational institutions have the 
right to select a diversified student body without excessive judicial 
3 1 7. There is a long line of S upreme Court cases beginning with Missouri ex rel Gaines v. 
Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), in which the Court noted that such exclusionary conduct was 
specifically prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment For example, in Gaines, Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes concluded as follows: 
By the operation of the laws of Missouri a privilege has been created for white law 
students which is denied to negroes by reason of their race. The white resident is 
afforded legal education within the State; the negro resident having the same qualifications 
is refused it there and must go outside the State to obtain it. That is a denial of the 
equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up, and 
the provision for the payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove the 
discrimination. 
Id. at 349-50. 
Similarly, in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1 950), the Court ordered Herman Sweatt's 
admission to the University of Texas Law School. In that decision, Chief Justice Vinson, in 
reiterating the Court's burgeoning commitment to equality of the laws, concluded that the "petitioner 
may claim his full constitutional right legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to 
students of other races. Such education is not available to him in a separate law school as offered 
by the State." Id. at 635. These cases paved the way for the Court's landmark decision in Brown, 
in which the Supreme Court finally concluded that segregation in public education constituted a 
deprivation of the "equal protection o f  the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment" Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1 954). 
3 1 8. But see CARL COHEN, NAKED RACIAL PREFERENCE 77 ( 1995). Professor Cohen commented 
as follows: 
Id. 
Finally, there is one troubling aspect of the Bakke decision that flows directly from the 
Powell principles. It may be taken to proffer an invitation that could lead to most 
unhappy practices. We are told that the Constitution permits the consideration of race in 
admissions for the sake of diversity to further the First Amendment interest in free ex· 
pression. That being so, it would appear that other suspect classifications-by political 
affiliation or by religion-may also be used for the sake of diversity. This is a 
disquieting result. Should the fact that one is a Republican or a Socialist, Catholic or Jew, 
be allowed to count in the distribution of opportunities? Even if by invoking such 
considerations we could increase diversity in some contexts, they surely ought never be 
factors in the apportionment o f  any public goods. History gives us strong reasons to con­
clude that the uses of such classifications, even for putatively honorable goals, invite 
disaster. We forswear them. For the same reasons, even if Bakke permits us to promote 
diversity in a student body, it will be the part of wisdom to forswear the use of race as 
well. 
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scrutiny. Notwithstanding equal protection guarantees, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that there are some areas of society that must be 
protected from excessive governmental interference. The attainment of 
diversity within the educational environment is worthy of such protection. 
Institutional autonomy is a necessary component of this effort. Educa­
tional institutions can only function in an atmosphere that affords them 
with the opportunity to make academic decisions that preserve the 
"marketplace of ideas" that is the foundation of the academic community. 
Assembling this marketplace requires the admission of groups of people 
with diverse interests, backgrounds, and life experiences. S uch diversi­
fied admissions decision-making modifies existing educational paradigms, 
and influences every facet of the traditional goals of an educational 
institution-teaching, inquiry, research and scholarship. 
